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CHOOSING WHICH RULE TO BREAK FIRST:   
AN IN-HOUSE ATTORNEY WHISTLEBLOWER’S 
CHOICES AFTER DISCOVERING A POSSIBLE 
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW VIOLATION 
Naseem Faqihi* 
 
The early twenty-first century has seen several instances of large-scale 
federal securities law violations—such as Enron, WorldCom, and the 
Bernie Madoff scandal—that have garnered widespread attention and 
heavily impacted the global economy.  In each of these cases, 
whistleblowers tried to expose the underlying fraud.  These and other 
scandals led to the enactment of new laws to protect whistleblowers who 
seek to expose these kinds of violations. 
In-house attorneys are in a special position to discover, understand, and 
expose their organization’s federal securities violations.  However, should 
in-house attorneys discover misconduct, and when deciding whether or not 
to take action, they must take into account several different and potentially 
conflicting governing regimes.  As whistleblowers, they can be subject to 
various state and federal laws, each of which will require them to respond 
differently in order to be protected from retaliation.  These laws have also 
been interpreted in different ways by different courts.  As attorneys, they 
are subject to state rules of professional conduct, and perhaps other rules 
governing professional conduct under federal law.  As in-house attorneys, 
they may face additional restrictions, since their employer is also their 
client.  These different regimes can permit or even require attorneys to take 
conflicting actions in any given situation, making it potentially difficult for 
an attorney to act without breaking at least one rule or law. 
This Note argues that in-house attorney whistleblowers should be 
expected to act in the same way across different governing regimes.  In-
house attorneys should be required to report federal securities violations 
internally first and be permitted to report externally thereafter if the 
violation is not resolved. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2015, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2009, American 
University in Dubai.  Many thanks to Professor James J. Brudney for his insight and 
guidance.  I also thank my family and friends for their endless love, encouragement, and 
patience. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine for a moment that you are the in-house counsel at a publicly 
traded corporation, and you have just discovered that your employer is 
involved in a potentially massive violation of federal securities law.  You 
are aware that others have been in this position before, and that their next 
steps have been scrutinized closely, discussed publicly, and linked to some 
of the largest financial scandals in history.  Ethically, what is the next step 
you should take?  Should you alert someone within the organization, or will 
this lead to a cover-up?  How can you act without violating the attorney-
client privilege?  Legally, what steps can you take to ensure that you are 
protected from retaliation?  Even further, what steps should you take to 
avoid sanctions?  Should you become a whistleblower? 
On October 1, 2013, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) announced an award of more than $14 million to an anonymous, 
individual whistleblower.1  This is the largest award that the Commission 
has made since the 2011 establishment of its whistleblower program, the 
Office of the Whistleblower (OW).2  The OW was created pursuant to the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act3 (the Dodd-
Frank Act).  The OW rewards whistleblowers who provide original 
information leading to a successful SEC enforcement action of more than 
$1 million in sanctions with between 10 percent to 30 percent of the money 
collected.4  Prior to this award, the OW had only made two others:  one in 
the amount of $50,000 in August 2012 and one in the amount of $125,000 
in August 2013.5  These awards pale in comparison to the one most recently 
 
 1. Press Release, SEC, SEC Awards More Than $14 Million to Whistleblower (Oct. 1, 
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539
854258#.UoYfjo0mwl0. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42 U.S.C.); see also Press Release, supra note 1. 
 4. See Press Release, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. 
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announced, most obviously in the size of the award, but also in terms of the 
potential long-term public impact, which the first two awards seemed to 
have very little.6 
In the announcement, SEC Chair Mary Jo White stated that the 
Commission hopes that the award will encourage those with information to 
come forward.7  At the whistleblower’s request, the SEC has kept many 
details around the most recent award private.8  Since the program rewards 
whistleblowers with between 10 to 30 percent of total money collected, 
however, it is possible to deduce that the total sanctions in this case were at 
least $47 million.9  Although this has been the OW’s largest award yet,10 
the underlying large-scale federal securities violation is by no means a 
recent phenomenon:  the Dodd-Frank Act, which established the OW, was 
enacted partly in response to one of the most infamous federal securities 
violations in recent history, the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme.11  In 2009, 
Madoff pleaded guilty to eleven felony counts and was imprisoned for a 
maximum sentence of 150 years12 for managing a global Ponzi scheme that 
prosecutors valued at more than $64.8 billion.13 
One of the most controversial issues surrounding the Madoff case was 
that a whistleblower, Harry Markopolos, repeatedly tried to bring the fraud 
to the SEC’s attention for nine years and was continuously ignored.14  In his 
subsequent testimony in front of the House Financial Services Committee, 
Markopolos accused the SEC of “investigative ineptitude” and “financial 
illiteracy.”15  His book16 revealed the extent of his desperation and 
frustration with the situation:  Markopolos had even considered the 
 
 6. SEC Issues First Large Award in Whistleblower Program, CLIENT ALERT (Latham & 
Watkins LLP, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2, 2013, at 2, available at http://www.lw.com/
thoughtLeadership/lw-sec-first-large-whistleblower-award (“Will this award inspire many 
more would-be whistleblowers to contact the SEC in hopes of getting rich?  That remains to 
be seen.  But Congress and the Commission have already bet that the answer will be yes.”). 
 7. Press Release, supra note 1. 
 8. SEC Issues First Large Award in Whistleblower Program, supra note 6, at 1. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 11. See, e.g., Chris W. Haaf & Monica C. Platt, 2011 Sees Focus on Whistleblowing and 
Dodd-Frank Claims, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan. 2012, at 1, 1. 
 12. United States v. Madoff, No. 09 Crim. 213(DC), 2009 WL 3347945 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
13, 2009). 
 13. Martha Graybow, Madoff Mysteries Remain As He Nears Guilty Plea, REUTERS 
(Mar. 11, 2009, 4:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/11/us-madoff-
idUSTRE52A5JK20090311?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true.  The fraud 
was later valued lower at $13 billion, according to court documents related to Madoff’s 
sentencing. See Madoff Gets 150 Years; Loss Now at $13 Billion, ANDREWS BANKR. LITIG. 
REP., Aug. 7, 2009, at 6, 6. 
 14. Robert Chew, A Madoff Whistle-Blower Tells His Story, TIME (Feb. 9, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1877181,00.html. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Madoff Whistle-Blower Slams S.E.C. in New Book, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, (Feb. 26, 
2010, 7:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/02/26/madoff-whistle-blower-slams-s-e-
c-in-new-book/?_r=0. 
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possibility of killing Madoff, if personally threatened.17  It was in the wake 
of this scandal, among others, that the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted to 
expand on the previously existing antiretaliation protections and monetary 
incentives afforded to whistleblowers who expose securities fraud.18  The 
OW received 3,001 tips and complaints from all fifty states in 2012, its first 
full fiscal year of operation.19 
Against this background of large-scale financial fraud and 
whistleblowing scandals, in-house attorneys may be forced to navigate a 
complex web of governing regimes when deciding whether or not to 
become whistleblowers.20  Due to the nature of their profession, in-house 
counsel may be more likely to uncover federal securities violations.21  
However, attorneys may be subject to other standards, such as attorney-
client confidentiality and may be expected to act differently than other 
whistleblowers.22  In-house attorneys, in particular, must consider that their 
employer is also their client.23 
This Note examines the choices available to in-house attorneys who 
suspect that their employer is violating federal securities law and must 
decide whether to report the misconduct, and, if so, whether to do so 
internally or externally.  The Note explores the different choices in-house 
attorneys can make to protect themselves against retaliation and avoid 
sanctions. 
Part I of this Note provides a general background to the relevant law, 
beginning with a discussion of who whistleblowers are, whether or not they 
should be protected, and how they can be protected.  Next, Part I provides 
some of the main federal and state laws that protect whistleblowers and the 
special considerations in-house attorney whistleblowers may face. 
Part II addresses the main conflicts that arise due to the sometimes 
conflicting regimes described in Part I and the resulting issues that in-house 
attorneys face when they become whistleblowers:  whether reports should 
be made internally or externally and determining which law applies.24  
 
 17. Id. (“If he contacted me and threatened me, I was going to drive down to New York 
and take him out. . . .  The government would have forced me into it by failing to do its job, 
and failing to protect me.  In that situation I felt I had no other options.  I was going to kill 
him.”). 
 18. See infra notes 107–14 and accompanying text. 
 19. SEC, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, FISCAL 
YEAR 2012, at 4–5 (2012) available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-
2012.pdf. 
 20. See infra Part I.D. 
 21. See infra notes 209–84 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra Part I.D.2. 
 23. See infra notes 285–93 and accompanying text. 
 24. The extraterritorial applications of these laws, and the additional complexities 
arising from conflicts with foreign laws, are beyond the scope of this Note.  For a discussion 
of the extraterritorial application of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, see Ian L. Schaffer, An 
International Train Wreck Caused in Part by a Defective Whistle:  When the Extraterritorial 
Application of SOX Conflicts with Foreign Laws, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1829 (2006).  For a 
discussion of the extraterritorial application of the Dodd-Frank Act, see Nicole H. Sprinzen, 
Asadi v. GE Energy (USA) L.L.C.:  A Case Study of the Limits of Dodd-Frank Anti-
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Additionally, Part II expands on the hypothetical scenario introduced above 
to demonstrate the difficulties attorney whistleblowers may face in 
navigating different laws. 
Part III of the Note proposes that in-house attorneys should be held to a 
uniform standard under the various regimes that apply to them.  This Part 
recommends that in-house attorneys should be required to report federal 
securities violations internally first and permitted to disclose information 
externally if there is no resolution. 
I.  ATTORNEY WHISTLEBLOWERS, THE LAWS THAT PROTECT THEM,  
AND THE LAWS THAT DO NOT 
Part I of this Note begins with a discussion of who whistleblowers are, 
whether or not they should be protected, and how they can be protected.  
This is followed with a background of some of the main federal laws 
protecting whistleblowers.  Because even whistleblowers who disclose 
federal securities violations can be protected under certain state laws, these 
state laws are discussed in subsequent sections.  Finally, this Part explores 
how the laws apply to in-house attorneys and discusses the special factors 
that they must consider. 
A.  Whistleblowers:  Who Are They, Should We Protect Them,  
and How Do We Go About It? 
Part I.A provides an overview of who whistleblowers are, the different 
reasons for protecting them, and the different mechanisms for these 
protections. 
1.  Who Are Whistleblowers? 
The term “whistleblower” is often credited to consumer activist Ralph 
Nader, who is said to have coined the term in the early 1970s.25  Others 
have said that the term originates from police officers blowing their 
whistles to warn onlookers about illegal activity.26  The U.S. Supreme 
Court first used the term—somewhat dismissively—in 1983, referring to 
“so-called whistleblowers.”27  While the term may be more commonly used 
today, in order to discuss whistleblowers and the scope of protection that is 
afforded to them, it is helpful to first define who they are. 
 
retaliation Protections and the Impact on Corporate Compliance Objectives, 51 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 151 (2014). 
 25. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Four Signal Moments in Whistleblower Law:  1983–
2013, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389, 389 (2013) (citing WHISTLE BLOWING:  THE 
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Ralph Nader et al. eds., 
1972), but acknowledging that other sources have identified earlier uses of the term). 
 26. Geneva Campbell, Snitch or Savior?  How the Modern Cultural Acceptance of 
Pharmaceutical Company Employee External Whistleblowing is Reflected in Dodd-Frank 
and the Affordable Care Act, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 565, 568 (2013). 
 27. Rapp, supra note 25, at 389–90 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385 n.25 
(1983)). 
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There is no single, universally accepted definition of a whistleblower.28  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a whistleblower as “an employee who 
reports employer wrongdoing to a governmental or law-enforcement 
agency.”29  The New Oxford American Dictionary, on the other hand, 
defines the term more broadly as “a person who informs on someone 
engaged in an illicit activity.”30  Some definitions are even broader, 
categorizing “any employee who ‘opposes’ the conduct, actions, or 
decisions of his or her employer” as a whistleblower.31  However, a 
definition this broad is not very useful for the purposes of this Note, 
because it could include any employee who expresses discontent—or even 
just disagrees—with his or her employer.32 
For the purposes of this Note, a whistleblower is defined as an employee 
who discloses information relating to a potential violation of the law by his 
or her employer, to parties that are either internal or external to the 
organization, for the purpose of preventing the wrongdoing.33  This 
definition is useful for the scope of this Note, which addresses the issues 
faced by in-house counsel whose employers may have violated federal 
securities laws and who must decide whether or not to disclose information 
either internally or externally.  The definition includes these in-house 
attorneys, while being broad enough to also include other whistleblowers 
who may face similar issues and whose experiences are discussed in this 
Note.34 
2.  Should We Protect Whistleblowers? 
An understanding of a whistleblower’s motivations may help shape a 
discussion of whether—and how—a whistleblower should be protected and 
perhaps even incentivized for his or her actions.  Before exploring the 
different arguments for protecting and incentivizing whistleblowers, this 
section explores the different motives that whistleblowers may have for 
their actions. 
 
 28. Peter D. Banick, Case Note, The “In-House” Whistleblower:  Walking the Line 
Between “Good Cop, Bad Cop,” 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1868, 1872 (2011). 
 29. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1734 (9th ed. 2009). 
 30. NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1971 (3d ed. 2010). 
 31. Banick, supra note 28, at 1871 (citing Jonathan W.J. Armour, Who’s Afraid of the 
Big, Bad Whistle?:  Minnesota’s Recent Trend Toward Limiting Employer Liability Under 
the Whistleblower Statute, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 107, 109 n.13 (1995)). 
 32. Id. at 1871 n.17 (“The word ‘oppose’ is so open and ambiguous in this context that it 
could arguably include employees who simply express discontent to their co-workers or any 
other person regarding their employer—or, even employees who internally disagree with 
their employers but never show any objective manifestation of their dissent.”). 
 33. Id. at 1873.  Here, the “purpose” of preventing wrongdoing means that the ultimate 
goal is to make the wrongdoing known to another party and does not refer to any personal 
motives for blowing the whistle. Id. at 1873 n.24. 
 34. The famed whistleblowers discussed in this section were not in-house lawyers. 
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a.  What Incentivizes Whistleblowers? 
Research shows that there are many different factors that motivate 
whistleblowers and that these factors may vary depending on context.35  
Generally speaking, motivations can be grouped into two categories:  
intrinsic or extrinsic.36  Extrinsic motivation is linked to behavior that is 
motivated by external factors such as rewards and payments.  Intrinsic 
motivation is driven by an individual’s sense of moral or civic duty.37  For 
example, whistleblowers may perceive the wrongdoing to run counter to the 
organization’s stated goals, “the purposes society has for its business 
sector,” or their own moral standards.38 
Whether a whistleblower is motivated by intrinsic or extrinsic factors 
may depend on the context; for example, one experimental study has shown 
that monetary rewards can frequently affect the level of reporting, unless 
the underlying violation is perceived as morally offensive.39  Thus, 
according to the study, when the whistleblower attaches an ethical 
significance to the act of reporting, monetary rewards are not consequential 
in determining his or her actions.40  On the other hand, in the absence of a 
perceived moral issue, monetary rewards were shown to be decisive.41  
Interestingly, in these situations, rewards of small monetary value—
compared to the absence of any reward at all—seemed to discourage 
reporting.42  This phenomenon may be attributed to a “crowding-out 
effect,”43 whereby the introduction of an external factor such as a reward 
may dampen the intrinsic motivations of those who would report 
wrongdoing without it.44 
 
 35. Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6 
OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 124 (2011) (citing Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, 
The Incentives Matrix:  The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and 
Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151 (2010)); see also Campbell, supra 
note 26, at 569 (“[E]mployees frequently have mixed motives for reporting wrongdoing.”). 
 36. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 35, at 1178. 
 37. Id.  There is ongoing debate about the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation.  While some studies suggest that extrinsic factors—such as rewards—can 
undermine intrinsic motivation, others show that the two types of motivation can reinforce 
each other.  Some literature suggests that when people attribute their own behavior to 
extrinsic factors or rewards, they discount their own intrinsic motivations for the behavior 
and thereby undermine the perceived effect of intrinsic factors. Id. at 1178–79. 
 38. Campbell, supra note 26, at 569–70 (quoting JACK BEHRMAN, ESSAYS ON ETHICS IN 
BUSINESS AND THE PROFESSIONS 140 (1998)). 
 39. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 35, at 1202. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing?  Bounty Regimes, Regulatory 
Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2341808.  Studies 
have shown that people may discount the intrinsic motivations for their behavior when 
extrinsic factors are introduced. See supra note 37; see also Feldman & Lobel, supra note 
35, at 1181 n.190 (citing Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Environmental Morale and 
Motivation 14–16 (Univ. of Zurich Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper 
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A whistleblower can also be motivated by how they think others will 
act.45  For example, if there is a monetary reward, the whistleblower may 
suspect that others will also come forward and may behave strategically to 
be the first to collect the reward.46  However, potential whistleblowers may 
not necessarily be able to predict others’ actions accurately:  experiments 
have shown that individuals perceive themselves as more motivated by 
intrinsic, ethical factors than other individuals.47 
Differing motivations may affect whether a whistleblower reports 
wrongdoing internally or externally.48  For example, if employees are 
concerned about their colleagues’ wrongdoing, they may opt to make 
internal reports.49  On the other hand, if they are motivated by a desire to 
protect the public welfare or to stop a large-scale violation that the whole 
company is involved in, they may choose to report to external parties.50 
Whistleblowers must also make their decisions about whether to report 
wrongdoing in light of substantial disincentives to refrain from acting:  “[i]t 
is difficult emotionally, personally, intellectually and professionally to 
come forward and blow the whistle on one’s employer, colleagues and 
friends.”51  Empirical evidence has shown that whistleblowers can suffer 
psychological, professional, and even physical harm as a result of their 
disclosures.52 
Potential whistleblowers may be reluctant to act because of a strong fear 
of social ostracism.53  This can range from receiving the “cold shoulder” or 
“silent treatment” from colleagues to full-blown social rejection.54  
Whistleblowers may find themselves excluded from emails, offices memos, 
and other communications,55 and are often viewed as “problem 
 
No. 288, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=900370) 
(noting that these situations result in the negative effect of eliminating intrinsic motivations 
while not introducing sufficiently strong incentives to achieve the desired behavior through 
extrinsic motivation). 
 45. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 35, at 1203. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  “These findings are generally in line with the psychological holier-than-thou 
effect—the general belief of individuals that they themselves are more ethically driven than 
others.” Id. 
 48. Campbell, supra note 26, at 570. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection:  Invigorating Incentives for 
Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 118 
(2007) (quoting Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 61 (2002)). 
 52. Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing:  What the 
Corporate Governance Provisions of Sarbanes Oxley Mean for Employment Law, 11 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 16 (2007). 
 53. Rapp, supra note 51, at 120.  “A century ago, William James wrote that ‘[n]o more 
fiendish punishment could be devised’ than social ostracism.  Ostracism threatens a basic 
human motivation to avoid exclusion from important social groups.” Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 120–21. 
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employees.”56  These forms of ostracism can have a strong psychological 
and even physical impact on a whistleblower.57  Psychologically, aside 
from the effects stemming from social ostracism, whistleblowers can suffer 
from “nagging doubts that their suspicions are not justified and that they 
may be, or may be perceived as, ‘crazy.’”58  Many whistleblower cases can 
drag on for years, during which time the psychological strains and doubts 
experienced by both the whistleblower and those closest to him or her can 
have severe consequences, leading many whistleblowers to lose their 
families.59 
Professionally, even with antiretaliation protections, whistleblowers can 
find themselves without a job, since a revelation of serious fraud can 
destroy the corporation they work for.60  Moreover, even if whistleblowers 
do not continue working for their employer, they may fear being blacklisted 
by the industry that they work in.61  Whistleblowers commonly fear that 
they will be “boycotted” by companies—even an entire industry—and that 
they will have to “live their lives in misery, shunned by employers.”62  
Thus, whistleblowers “often face the difficult choice between telling the 
truth and the risk of committing ‘career suicide.’”63  Those who rank higher 
in the managerial hierarchy may be more sensitive to the risk of being 
blacklisted, since they are more likely to have industry-specific skills.64  
This can significantly affect the amount and quality of information that is 
revealed, since higher-ranking employees tend to have a wider view of the 
organization and are likely to have better information about wrongdoing.65 
Interestingly, the social and professional stigmas that a whistleblower 
may face vary depending on the perceived motivations behind the 
whistleblower’s actions.66  Whistleblowers acting in response to a duty to 
report can be viewed in a better light than those who act—or are perceived 
to act—in response to a monetary reward.67  One experimental study has 
shown that even when the potential rewards are low, and even when they 
are combined with a duty to report, whistleblowers receive low levels of 
social respect and appreciation.68  Conversely, when there is no monetary 
reward, whistleblowers seem to draw consistently higher levels of social 
 
 56. John Ashcroft et al., Whistleblowers Cash In, Unwary Corporations Pay, 40 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 367, 407 (2011). 
 57. Rapp, supra note 51, at 121. 
 58. Id. at 123 (quoting ROBIN PAGE WEST, ADVISING THE QUI TAM WHISTLEBLOWER:  
FROM IDENTIFYING A CASE TO FILING UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 30 (2001)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 119. 
 61. Id. at 124.  While antiretaliation protections can help whistleblowers keep their jobs 
with their original employers, future employers may discriminate against them. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111 (2010). 
 64. Engstrom, supra note 44. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 35, at 1205. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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admiration.69  Thus, whistleblowers’ perceived motivation can affect 
whether they are praised or stigmatized for their actions, and this perceived 
motivation is in turn affected by how whistleblowers are incentivized.70 
Because of these different societal responses, whistleblowers may 
experience a range of consequences as a result of their actions.  The next 
section explores the different ways in which society views and portrays 
whistleblowers, and how this ultimately shapes their experiences. 
b.  The Whistleblower Experience:   
From Rats and Snitches to Persons of the Year 
This section explores varying societal attitudes toward whistleblowers 
and how they affect their overall experience.  Additionally, this section 
examines the experiences of several high-profile whistleblowers in recent 
history.  As discussed below, these individuals have been instrumental in 
changing the legal—and perhaps also the societal—treatment of 
whistleblowers. 
In the past, whistleblowers have been portrayed negatively, even as 
“lowlife[s] who betray[] a sacred trust largely for personal gain.”71  This 
view seems to have shifted to the opposite extreme in recent years:  
whistleblowers are now often portrayed in the media as taking heroic steps 
that may potentially stop corrupt practices.72  The change in society’s 
portrayal of whistleblowers may correspond to the passage of corporate 
laws and regulations that “express a decidedly moral view of 
whistleblowers as allies in the fight against corporate fraud, bribery, and 
corruption.”73  Historically, policymakers openly viewed and referred to 
whistleblowers in negative, derogatory terms, calling them “rat[s]” and 
“snitches.”74  For example, in a 1998 congressional debate about the 
Internal Revenue Service’s whistleblower program, one senator called it the 
“Snitch Program” and the “Reward for Rats Program.”75  A former Reagan 
Administration official who was in charge of the federal whistleblower 
program referred to whistleblowers as “malcontents.”76 
In light of this poor view of whistleblowers, it is not surprising that their 
disclosures were viewed negatively:  one prominent example is the 
response to A. Ernest Fitgerald’s disclosures.77  Fitzgerald was a 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1159 (alteration in original) (quoting TERANCE D. MIETHE, WHISTLEBLOWING 
AT WORK:  TOUGH CHOICES IN EXPOSING FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE ON THE JOB 12 (1999). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives:  Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the 
New Era of Dodd-Frank Act “Bounty Hunting,” 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 490 (2012). 
 74. Id. at 491 (alteration in original). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Jocelyn Patricia Bond, Efficiency Considerations and the Use of Taxpayer 
Resources:  An Analysis of Proposed Whistleblower Protection Act Revisions, 19 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 107, 107 (2009). 
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management analyst with the Department of the Air Force78 and made 
history in 1968 by testifying before the Joint Economic Committee 
regarding the Pentagon’s $2 billion cost overruns on an aircraft program.79  
As a federal government employee, his public disclosures regarding 
government inefficiency were considered unthinkable at the time.80  
Although Fitzgerald was later hailed as “the father of all whistleblowers” 
for his courageous efforts in protecting American taxpayers, his initial 
experience was very different:  “he was branded as disloyal to his country, 
lost his job, and sparked a firestorm of media and Congressional 
attention.”81 
When President Richard Nixon was questioned about Fitzgerald’s 
dismissal at a press conference, he promised to look into the matter.82  
Some time later, in an internal memorandum addressing Fitzgerald’s 
possible reassignment, a White House aide remarked, “Fitzgerald is no 
doubt a top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low marks in 
loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game.”83  The aide 
recommended that the administration “let him bleed, for a while at least.”84  
Eventually—and after a lengthy court battle that reached the U.S. Supreme 
Court—Fitzgerald was, by court order, reinstated to a position in the 
executive branch.85 
The Nixon Administration was later implicated in the Watergate 
scandal—another high-profile case involving a whistleblower—which 
eventually led to President Nixon’s resignation.86  Mark Felt, infamously 
known as “Deep Throat,” leaked the story that President Nixon’s reelection 
campaign had broken into the Democratic National Committee 
Headquarters using illegally acquired corporate funds.87  Subsequent 
investigations revealed that corrupt foreign payments—in the amounts of 
hundreds of millions of dollars—were made by publicly traded U.S. 
companies.88  Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
197789 (FCPA) in response to these revelations.90  Among other things, the 
FCPA introduced requirements for companies registered with the SEC to 
have internal controls, including internal whistleblower procedures.91  
 
 78. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 733 (1982). 
 79. Bond, supra note 77, at 107.  Some of Fitzgerald’s more famous disclosures 
included those related to the Pentagon’s expenditures on $7,622 coffee pots, $670 passenger-
seat arm rests, and $200 hammers. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 735. 
 83. Id. at 735–36 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 84. Id. at 736 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 85. Bond, supra note 77, at 107. 
 86. Vega, supra note 73, at 493. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 
(2012)). 
 90. Vega, supra note 73, at 494. 
 91. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 
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Therefore, whistleblower Mark Felt’s actions led to the “first transformative 
moment for whistleblowers in corporate governance.”92 
The next transformative moment took place after Sherron Watkins and 
Cynthia Cooper uncovered major financial scandals:  the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals.93  In response, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 200294 (SOX).95  Among other things, SOX included the “first set of 
comprehensive federal whistleblower provisions protecting employees who 
raise concerns about a violation of any federal criminal statute.”96 
In 2001, Watkins submitted an anonymous internal memorandum to 
Enron Chairman Ken Lay that began with the sentence “I am incredibly 
nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting scandals.”97  Watkins 
knew that the company’s assets were artificially inflated via an elaborate 
accounting hoax.98  Shortly after sending the memo, Watkins met with Lay, 
provided five new memoranda detailing the issues, and encouraged him to 
hire an independent law firm to conduct an investigation.99  Although 
Watkins urged Lay not to hire the law firm that had helped structure some 
of the questionable deals in the first place, Lay proceeded to do so.100  The 
law firm conducted a limited investigation and reported that the transactions 
were unproblematic.101  Enron filed for bankruptcy three months later.102 
After learning of Watkins’s contact with Lay, Andrew Fastow—
Watkins’s supervisor and the company’s chief financial officer—reportedly 
wanted to seize her computer and fire her.103  Watkins requested a transfer 
to another department and her computer was returned to her, however her 
work assignments decreased drastically.104  Moreover, it later emerged that 
when Lay instructed the law firm to investigate Watkins’s concerns, he also 
requested that the firm assess whether Watkins could be fired without any 
legal repercussions.105  Although Watkins was named one of Time 
magazine’s “Persons of the Year” in 2002, she reported that she was 
ostracized at the company after her disclosures.106 
 
 92. Vega, supra note 73, at 493. 
 93. Id. at 494.  In 2002, Watkins and Cooper were named Time magazine’s “Persons of 
the Year.” Id. at 496. 
 94. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 95. Vega, supra note 73, at 495. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond:  Life and Crime After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 360 (2003). 
 98. Id. at 360–61. 
 99. Id. at 361. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 362. 
 103. Dan Ackman, Sherron Watkins Had Whistle, But Blew It, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2002, 
3:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2002/02/14/0214watkins.html. 
 104. Brickey, supra note 97, at 362–64 & nn.28–30. 
 105. Id. at 362–63. 
 106. Tippett, supra note 52, at 17.  Cynthia Cooper, who was named one of Time 
magazine’s “Persons of the Year” along with Watkins, similarly discovered massive fraud 
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As discussed in the Introduction to this Note, the most recent major 
development with respect to whistleblowers and corporate governance, the 
Dodd-Frank Act, was passed in response to the massive fraud perpetrated 
by Bernie Madoff.107  Whistleblower Harry Markopolos, who worked at a 
rival firm, researched Madoff’s supposed trading strategy and “became 
convinced that [his] returns were not real.”108  Although Markopolos tried 
to alert the SEC at least five times,109 he was ignored for years.110  During 
this time, and until Madoff was finally in federal custody, Markopolos said 
he feared for his life, particularly because he believed that some of the 
billions of dollars at stake belonged to the Russian mafia and drug cartels 
and that these groups would “kill to protect their investments.”111  In his 
book, Markopolos revealed that he checked under the chassis and wheel 
wells before starting his car, walked away from shadows at night, and slept 
with a loaded gun nearby.112  In February 2009, Markopolos testified before 
Congress’s Financial Services Committee and exposed the SEC’s failure to 
detect Madoff’s fraud.113  In July 2010, President Barack Obama signed the 
Dodd-Frank Act into law.114 
These examples of whistleblowers’ attempts to uncover corruption show 
that they often face severe professional and personal repercussions and are 
regularly retaliated against or ignored, even when the underlying fraud is 
potentially devastating.  As discussed above, the various laws that were 
enacted in response to these whistleblowers’ experiences and attempts to 
reveal fraud all increased whistleblower protection in some way.  The next 
section explores some of the different reasons for providing this protection. 
c.  Why Should We Protect Whistleblowers? 
The experiences of the high-profile whistleblowers discussed in the 
section above show that a whistleblower’s attempts to reveal wrongdoing 
are not always received positively.  Part I.B and Part I.C below discuss the 
various statutory and common law whistleblower protections that aim to 
counterbalance this effect.  Before discussing these protections, this section 
explores the reasons for them:  why should society protect or even 
encourage actions by whistleblowers?  Numerous policy reasons have been 
 
orchestrated by WorldCom’s chief financial officer and reported it to the board of directors. 
Vega, supra note 73, at 494–95. 
 107. See supra notes 11–19 and accompanying text. 
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put forward to answer this question.115  These justifications can be 
organized into three broad categories, discussed below.116 
First, protecting whistleblowers encourages legal compliance by their 
employers, which in turn benefits public welfare.117  By playing a 
prominent role in discovering and exposing misconduct, whistleblowers 
incentivize organizations to prevent or stop illegal activity, which is “a 
valuable service to both their employers and the public at large.”118  
Moreover, if organizations account for the possibility of employees 
becoming whistleblowers, this can deter misconduct in the first instance.119  
According to this justification, because whistleblowers face inherent risks 
for their actions, they should be incentivized to “break the code of silence in 
corrupt organizations.”120 
The second popular justification for protection is related to efficiency:  
whistleblowers partially lighten the burden on government regulators.121  
Without whistleblowers, government regulators would need to dedicate 
more resources to detecting and investigating illegal activity.122  In other 
words, whistleblowers can play a helpful law enforcement role in revealing 
wrongdoing.123  Some have gone so far as to say that “[t]he primary goal of 
many federal statutes, therefore, is not protection of the whistleblower.  
Rather, provisions protective of whistleblowers were included primarily as 
tools by which to advance the objectives of the legislation.”124  According 
to this theory, as regulatory agents’ budgets shrink, whistleblowers play an 
increasingly important law enforcement role.125 
Finally, the third broad category of justifying protection for 
whistleblowers is related to fairness and justice.126  Justifications in this 
category argue that because whistleblowers are “trying to do the right 
thing,”127 society should not punish them, and in fact, should try to protect 
them.128 
Having discussed who whistleblowers are and the different justifications 
for protecting them, the next section discusses the main mechanisms for 
doing so. 
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3.  How Can We Protect Whistleblowers? 
In order to examine existing whistleblower protection regimes (and their 
gaps) it is useful to first discuss the different available mechanisms for 
protection.  Providing whistleblowers with incentives, protection, or both—
the ultimate goals—can be approached in different ways.  There are four 
different ways that whistleblower protection laws generally work:  
(1) remedies focused on retaliation against whistleblowers, (2) remedies 
that reward whistleblowers, (3) remedies that reward employers for 
investigating wrongdoing and protecting whistleblowers, and (4) remedies 
that punish inaction by would-be whistleblowers.129 
a.  Remedies Focused on Retaliation 
Antiretaliation protection—and its application to in-house attorney 
whistleblowers—is a central issue in this Note.  Retaliation-based remedies 
are the primary way by which state and federal laws have sought to protect 
whistleblowers.130  Many antiretaliation protections were developed in 
response to scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, where many employees 
stayed silent due to fear of retribution.131  These remedies afford 
whistleblowers a cause of action in the event that their employer retaliates 
against them for blowing the whistle.132  Although state and federal 
whistleblower protection statutes vary considerably, almost all of them 
include an antiretaliation element.133  Typically, state and federal statutes 
bar employers from either discharging or otherwise discriminating against a 
whistleblower for their disclosure.134  Retaliation that “might dissuade a 
reasonable employee from blowing the whistle” is generally prohibited.135 
Remedies focused on retaliation also exist in common law.136  
Employees who bring tort claims for wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy must show that their employer retaliated against or terminated 
them because of their disclosure.137  Thus, even in areas where no statute 
provides antiretaliation protection, courts have devised a tort-based cause of 
action by holding that employees cannot be terminated for reporting legal 
 
 129. Tippett, supra note 52, at 4–15. 
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violations.138  However, courts vary in the extent to which they extend 
antiretaliation protections to “different channels of reporting, different types 
of reported misconducts, and different categories of workers.”139 
b.  Remedies That Reward Whistleblowers 
Another type of remedy incentivizes employees to report misconduct by 
providing financial rewards for certain disclosures.140  This reward-based 
type of remedy is available under both federal and state statutes.141  The 
Dodd-Frank Act, discussed further in Part II.B.3, is one example of this 
type of remedy.142 
Reward-based incentives are not as prevalent as antiretaliation protection 
and are both controversial and understudied.143  Scholars have noted the 
success of reward-based remedies in recovering government funds and 
rewarding whistleblowers.144  On the other hand, critics of reward-based 
whistleblower remedies point out that they can be unsavory to the public, 
lead to a backlash against whistleblowers, and motivate frivolous claims.145  
With respect to attorneys in particular, it may be undesirable for them to be 
rewarded for reporting misconduct, since this could potentially incentivize 
them to violate professional and ethical rules such as attorney-client 
confidentiality.146 
c.  Remedies That Reward Employers 
A third method to protect whistleblowers and promote their actions is to 
provide their employers with incentives to support them.147  This remedy 
emerged in reaction to both the “federal corporate sentencing guidelines, 
which provide for reduced penalties for organizations that attempt to detect 
and address wrongdoing,”148 and the Supreme Court ruling in Faragher v. 
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City of Boca Raton,149 which “provides employers with an affirmative 
defense in harassment cases where the employer takes reasonable measures 
to prevent and address harassment.”150  Under the corporate sentencing 
guidelines, employers may be able to take advantage of reduced liability if 
they are able to demonstrate that they had procedures to protect 
whistleblowers.151  Meanwhile, the “Faragher defense”152 is becoming 
more popular in situations involving whistleblowers.153 
Generally, there are arguments supporting a shift from an emphasis on 
external to internal whistleblower reporting.154  The goal of this shift is to 
incentivize the organization to stop misconduct earlier and perhaps 
completely, rather than focusing on punishing organizations that fail to stop 
misconduct.155  Shifting the primary focus away from the need to punish 
organizations saves government funds.156  Proponents of this type of 
remedy argue that by incentivizing employers to improve internal reporting 
structures, disclosure is more likely to be made internally, which results in 
less harm to both the whistleblower and the employer.157  Internal reporting 
can also be considered to be more ethical than external reporting.158 
On the other hand, opponents argue that incentivizing employers to 
improve internal reporting mechanisms will cause employers to invest less 
in remedying the underlying wrongdoing.159  Additionally, courts may not 
have the appropriate expertise to evaluate internal reporting and compliance 
structures,160 which can make this remedy difficult to enforce or encourage.  
The different arguments for and against both internal and external reporting 
are discussed further in Part II.A. 
d.  Remedies That Compel Whistleblowing 
The legislation that followed the early twenty-first century financial 
scandals included a range of affirmative duties.161  Affirmative duties—
which, in effect, require mandatory whistleblowing—are usually limited to 
senior corporate officers and members of select professions, such as 
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attorneys.162  Usually, these duties are limited to situations where either the 
victim of potential misconduct is especially vulnerable or where the 
resulting harm will be widespread.163 
Many affirmative duties impose civil and criminal liabilities in the event 
of a failure to report.164  In their most extreme form of criticism, these 
forms of mandatory whistleblowing or punitive whistleblowing remedies 
have been seen “as an affront to civil liberties and have been compared to 
Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, and McCarthyism.”165  However, some 
statutes still do mandate whistleblowing in limited situations.166  For 
example, New Jersey and Florida rules require lawyers to disclose a client’s 
intent to commit a future crime.167 
A leading example of a punitive approach to whistleblowing, and one 
that is prominently featured in this Note, is SOX, discussed further in Part 
II.B.2.  Although some parts of SOX still require corporate actors to report 
misconduct in specific situations,168 the SEC initially intended the Act to 
have more stringent mandatory whistleblowing requirements.169  
Originally, the SEC proposed regulations that mandated attorneys to 
withdraw representation from public companies that failed to respond 
adequately to corporate fraud allegations and to alert the SEC of their 
withdrawal.170  This “noisy withdrawal” requirement was vehemently 
opposed and was eventually dropped from the final regulation.171 
While SOX does not require corporate actors to directly report violations 
to government regulators, it does require them to make internal disclosures 
or investigations in certain situations.172  However, the positive reporting 
obligations in SOX are limited to the most senior ranks of the corporation, 
thereby narrowing the affirmative duty to report to those that are able to 
prevent violations early on.173  Since SOX does not reward disclosure but 
does punish inaction,174 it is an example of a punitive approach to 
promoting whistleblowing. 
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Having discussed who whistleblowers are, why they should be protected, 
and the different mechanisms for protecting them, the next two sections of 
this Note explore some existing whistleblower protection regimes that are 
relevant to federal securities violations. 
B.  The Federal Securities Laws Protecting Whistleblowers 
Part I.B gives an overview of the main protections afforded to 
whistleblowers at a federal level, particularly with respect to whistleblowers 
who report federal securities law violations. 
1.  General Federal Whistleblower Protections 
Laws protecting federal employees who become whistleblowers have 
existed for more than three decades.175  The Whistleblower Protection Act 
of 1989176 (WPA) forbids federal government employers from retaliating 
against employees for whistleblowing177 and is currently the primary 
federal statute that encourages and protects whistleblowers who are federal 
employees.178  However, the WPA does not protect employees of private 
organizations.179  Therefore, employees of private organizations may have 
to look to other federal statutes, or remedies under state law, for 
whistleblower protection.180  However, many whistleblower protection 
provisions are included as “one mechanism within greater enforcement 
schemes” in various federal statutes.181  These statutes can be limited in 
scope in that they protect disclosures within specific industries.182 
In contrast to the WPA, which protects only federal employees, 
whistleblower protections under the False Claims Act183 (FCA) cover 
disclosures that reveal attempts to defraud the federal government.184  
Although the FCA covers a wide range of activities relating to the federal 
government,185 and is one of the most well-known statutes offering 
whistleblower awards, it is aimed at recovering government funds.186  Since 
the FCA only provides whistleblower protection for those who make 
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disclosures about fraud against the federal government,187 whistleblowers 
who make disclosures about fraud against private parties will have to look 
elsewhere for protection. 
In the realm of federal securities law, whistleblowers who are private 
employees, or who make disclosures about private organizations, may find 
protection under SOX or the Dodd-Frank Act.  These are discussed in turn 
below. 
2.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
As mentioned in Part I.A.3, SOX was signed into law predominantly in 
response to large-scale corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom.188  
The legislation, which at least in the past has been called “the gold 
standard” of whistleblower protection,189 aimed to boost confidence in 
financial markets by regulating financial market reporting and improving 
protection for whistleblowers that report suspected wrongdoing.190 
By enacting SOX, Congress introduced federal whistleblower protection 
to corporate America.191  Public companies are prohibited from demoting, 
suspending, threatening, harassing, or discriminating against employees 
who engage in protected activities.192  Under SOX, employees can disclose 
information relating to what they reasonably believe is a violation of federal 
securities law.193  Thus, while some whistleblower protection provisions 
require a violation to have actually occurred for a whistleblower to be 
protected, under SOX an employee only needs to reasonably believe that it 
did.194  Finally, whistleblowers are generally protected if they disclose 
information either internally, to a supervisor or to someone who has 
authority to investigate misconduct, or externally, to federal regulatory or 
law enforcement agencies or a member of Congress.195 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) enforces 
SOX’s whistleblower antiretaliation provisions by conducting an 
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administrative proceeding after a whistleblower files a complaint.196  An 
employee who has faced adverse treatment from an employer for reporting 
misconduct has ninety days from the date of the discrimination to bring a 
claim to OSHA.197  If there is no decision within 180 days, the 
whistleblower can bring the claim in a federal district court for de novo 
review.198  Furthermore, if OSHA does issue a final order, an aggrieved 
party has the option of filing an appeal in a federal district court.199 
By protecting private employees who disclose potential federal securities 
violations, the passage of SOX increased awareness of the need for 
corporate governance structures.200  The passage of the Dodd-Frank Act 
was “a step farther on that continuum,” both by providing financial 
incentives for whistleblowers to come forward and by providing enhanced 
whistleblower protections.201 
3.  The Dodd-Frank Act 
As discussed in the Introduction to this Note, in July 2010, in response to 
the 2008 financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act to bolster 
accountability and transparency within the U.S. financial system.202  One of 
the ways in which Congress intended to achieve this goal was to incentivize 
whistleblowers to share their information with the government.203  Partly 
prompted by the Madoff scandal,204 the Dodd-Frank Act amended the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by protecting and rewarding those who 
help the SEC enforce securities law.205  In addition to providing financial 
incentives for whistleblowers, the Dodd-Frank Act “strengthens the anti-
retaliation provisions of SOX.”206 
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The securities whistleblower incentives and protections provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act encourage whistleblowers to report possible violations by 
requiring the SEC to pay monetary awards to those who provide 
information that leads to a successful enforcement action related to a federal 
securities violation.207  Whistleblowers who provide the SEC with original 
information that leads to a successful enforcement are awarded between 10 
to 30 percent of the recovered funds.208 
The Dodd-Frank Act also provides a private cause of action for 
whistleblowers who allege that an employer has retaliated against them for 
making a protected disclosure.209  Therefore, in contrast to whistleblowers 
who must file antiretaliation claims with OSHA for protection under 
SOX,210 under the Dodd-Frank Act, they can file actions directly in federal 
courts.211  Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act increases the statute of 
limitations to either “six years from the date of the violation, or three years 
after the employee knew or should have known the material facts relating to 
the violation.”212  This provides an extended time period for whistleblowers 
and their ability to bring retaliation claims, compared to the ninety-day 
window provided under SOX.213 
The securities whistleblower incentives and protections section of the 
Dodd-Frank Act initially defines the term “whistleblower” as “any 
individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who 
provide, information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the 
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the 
Commission.”214  This definition “expressly and unambiguously requires 
that an individual provide information to the SEC to qualify as a 
‘whistleblower’” under the Dodd-Frank Act.215  Therefore, those who 
report violations internally generally do not qualify as whistleblowers under 
this definition. 
However, the antiretaliation section of the Dodd-Frank Act separately 
outlines protections for whistleblowers who make “disclosures that are 
required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . section 
1513(e) of Title 18, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission.”216 
One interpretation of this provision is that it “establishes a narrow 
exception to . . . [the] definition of ‘whistleblower,’ and protects an 
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employee who makes any of that provision’s enumerated disclosures.”217  
Under this reading of the provision, those who disclose violations within 
these exceptions can still be afforded antiretaliation protection, even if they 
do not report directly to the SEC.218  As a result of this ambiguity, courts in 
the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have disagreed on how to 
reconcile the whistleblower definition and antiretaliation provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.219  This has resulted in an extra layer of ambiguity 
regarding how in-house attorney whistleblowers are expected to respond to 
potential federal securities violations.220 
Under the authority delegated to it by Congress, the SEC promulgated a 
final rule in August 2011 to implement the Dodd-Frank Act.221  The 
regulations clarify the relationship between the provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act that define the term “whistleblower” and those that provide 
antiretaliation protections.222  In its comments to the rule, the SEC 
explained that the antiretaliation protections apply to “individuals who 
report to persons or governmental authorities other than the 
Commission.”223  Moreover, the rule went a step further by providing 
additional incentives for whistleblowers to make internal disclosures.224  By 
voluntarily using the organization’s internal reporting structure, 
whistleblowers may be eligible for a higher reward, should a successful 
enforcement action ever take place.225  Additionally, if a whistleblower 
internally reports misconduct that is later shared with the SEC by another 
party, such as the organization, the information will still be attributed to the 
whistleblower and he or she will still be eligible for an award.226  Finally, 
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should the whistleblower report information internally on a certain date, it 
can be treated as if he or she had reported the information to the SEC on 
that date.227 
In Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC,228 the Southern District of New York 
followed the SEC’s interpretation described above.  The plaintiff 
whistleblower sued his former employer under the Dodd-Frank Act for 
allegedly firing him in retaliation for his internal disclosures.229  Murray 
was dismissed after he complained to his supervisors that he was, in 
violation of federal securities laws, being forced to produce misleading 
reports.230  His former employer argued that whistleblowers who report 
information internally are not protected under the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
antiretaliation provisions.231 
The court applied the two-step analysis from Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.232 to decide whether the SEC’s 
interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act warranted deference.233  Noting that 
the tension between the definition and antiretaliation provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act results in an ambiguity,234 the court moved to the second 
step of the Chevron analysis.  At the second step, the court argued that the 
SEC’s interpretation is reasonable, and that it therefore warrants 
deference.235  The court also noted that the SEC’s interpretation is 
consistent with the interpretations of four other district courts from the 
Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits.236 
In October 2013, the Southern District of New York repeated this 
reasoning in Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) LLC.237  Mark 
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Rosenblum suspected that his employer, Thomson Reuters, through one of 
its products, was releasing financial information to certain subscribers 
before others.238  He suspected that this constituted insider trading and 
attempted to raise the issue with higher authorities.239  After being 
discouraged more than once and being told to “stop trying to figure out 
what Thomson [was] doing wrong, and close more business,” Rosenblum 
disclosed his concerns to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.240  Some 
weeks after the disclosure, he was fired and subsequently brought an action 
against Thomson under the antiretaliation provisions of the Dodd-Frank 
Act.241 
The defendant argued that the court should follow the Fifth Circuit’s 
ruling in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,242 decided a few months 
prior243 in order to deny the plaintiff whistleblower antiretaliation 
protection under the Dodd-Frank Act.244  Again, the court found the statute 
to be ambiguous and deferred to the SEC’s interpretation, which it found 
reasonable.245  The defendant’s motion to dismiss (on this and other 
grounds) was denied,246 and the plaintiff was allowed to proceed with his 
claim even though he did not report the violation in question directly to the 
SEC.247 
Some months prior to Rosenblum, in July 2013, the Fifth Circuit ruled 
differently and dismissed an antiretaliation claim where the violation was 
reported internally, finding that the employee was not protected under the 
Dodd-Frank Act because he did not report the violation directly to the 
SEC.248  In Asadi, Khaled Asadi brought suit against his former employer, 
G.E. Energy, claiming that he was dismissed after internally reporting to his 
supervisors that the company was violating the FCPA.249 
The court addressed the opposing case law and the SEC regulation and 
determined that the “perceived conflict” between the definition and 
antiretaliation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act “rests on a misreading of 
the operative provisions.”250  According to the court, the antiretaliation 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act “represent the protected activity in a 
whistleblower-protection claim.  They do not, however, define which 
individuals qualify as whistleblowers.”251  Under this interpretation, the 
antiretaliation provisions protect whistleblowers from retaliation against 
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any subsequent action or disclosure “that follows on the heels of the 
information initially provided to the SEC.”252  Thus, a whistleblower would 
be protected under Dodd-Frank against retaliation for disclosures under 
SOX, even if they were made internally, only after an initial disclosure to 
the SEC.253 
The court in Asadi concluded that the SEC’s regulation interpreted the 
term “whistleblower” too broadly and created an exception that conflicted 
with Congress’s intent as demonstrated by the plain language of the Dodd-
Frank Act.254  This Fifth Circuit decision, along with the related uncertainty 
over the extent to which whistleblowers in general and attorneys in 
particular are protected under the Dodd-Frank Act, is discussed further in 
Part I.D.6. 
Before exploring the ways in which different federal whistleblower 
protections apply to attorneys, the next section will discuss the different 
state laws that protect whistleblowers and why these can still be relevant to 
those who report federal securities violations. 
C.  The State Laws Protecting Whistleblowers 
Although this Note addresses the conflicts experienced by in-house 
attorney whistleblowers who report federal securities violations, state laws 
can still be relevant.  Even if a whistleblower is retaliated against for 
reporting a federal securities violation, he or she may still be able to pursue 
antiretaliation protection under a state whistleblower statute.255  Moreover, 
if the retaliation is in the form of dismissal, the whistleblower may have a 
tort-based wrongful discharge cause of action under common law.256  The 
sections below explain these two remedies. 
1.  State Whistleblower Statutes 
All states now have whistleblower statutes,257 and they all include some 
form of antiretaliation protection.258  However, the protection of 
whistleblowers under state law still varies widely, both in the extent of 
protection provided under the statutes and in the judicial interpretations of 
the statutes.259  For example, most states protect public employee 
whistleblowers, while a minority protects private employees as well.260  
Some state statutes limit protection depending on the type of violation that 
the whistleblower aimed to expose; for example, New York only protects 
whistleblowers who reveal violations that pose a “substantial and specific 
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danger to public health or safety.”261  New Hampshire, on the other hand, 
extends protection to whistleblowers who, with reasonable belief, report a 
potential violation of any state law.262  Overall, the major areas of 
distinction among state whistleblower protections include:  which 
employees are protected, who the whistleblower should report to in order to 
be protected, what type of activity the whistleblower reports, whether or not 
the underlying violation must be actual or can be suspected, and what kind 
of remedies are available.263 
The biggest division among states is to whom a whistleblower can report 
wrongdoing in order to be protected.264  Several state statutes extend 
whistleblower protection only to employees who disclose misconduct 
externally to government bodies.265  A few states require employees to first 
report suspected wrongdoing internally, to their employers, in order to 
benefit from whistleblower protection.266  A handful of states are more 
flexible, allowing whistleblowers to make either internal or external 
reports.267 
Therefore, whether or not a whistleblower is protected under a state 
statute may depend on what state they happen to be in.  Even if a 
whistleblower is not protected under a state statute, the next section 
explores possible antiretaliation protections under common law. 
2.  Common Law Wrongful Discharge Tort Claims 
Aside from statutory antiretaliation provisions, most states now recognize 
a cause of action under the common law tort of wrongful discharge.268  
Similar to statutory protections, state-by-state variations exist on the 
elements of a wrongful discharge claim.269  Some of the differences are 
similar to the differences among state whistleblower protections; for 
example, there are state variations on wrongful discharge claims depending 
on whether the employee reports internally or externally, or on what type of 
violation the employee reports.270  Some states do not provide a remedy 
under wrongful discharge if the whistleblower reports a federal law 
violation and only extend this protection if it was a state law violation.271  
Furthermore, in some states the state whistleblower statute has been 
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interpreted to preempt a wrongful discharge claim for whistleblowers, while 
other states have allowed both remedies to coexist.272 
One example of a state court interpretation of a wrongful discharge claim 
is Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., where an in-house attorney 
brought a wrongful discharge tort claim against his former employer.273  
Nordling had complained to his superiors about what he believed was the 
unjustified surveillance of employees and the resulting invasion of the 
employees’ privacy.274  In response, Nordling’s phone calls were monitored 
and he was accused of spending time on personal matters during the 
workday and of spending too much time outside of the office.275  He was 
dismissed shortly thereafter.276 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota dismissed Nordling’s claim on the 
basis that the underlying misconduct for which he claimed to have been 
wrongfully discharged was not illegal under either federal or state law.277  
Although the surveillance “seem[ed] distasteful” and “ill-advised,” the 
court reasoned, it was not illegal.278  Therefore, his dismissal for 
complaining about the surveillance was not sufficient for the purposes of a 
wrongful discharge tort claim.279 
Although the court in Nordling analyzed the wrongful discharge claim in 
terms of the legality of the violation that was reported, other courts have 
applied a completely different analysis to wrongful discharge claims 
brought by in-house attorney whistleblowers.280   
D.  Attorney Whistleblowers 
Part I.D explores the special considerations of attorney whistleblowers 
and how they are treated under the various applicable whistleblower 
regimes.  First, this Part discusses why attorneys in general, and in-house 
counsel in particular, face special considerations as whistleblowers.  Next, it 
explores how whistleblower attorneys are expected to act under the various 
regimes that apply to them in the federal securities law context. 
1.  Why Do Attorney Whistleblowers Matter? 
By nature of their professions, attorneys are especially well placed to act 
as whistleblowers.281  Within their roles and due to their expertise, 
attorneys may already be responsible for leading corporate investigations 
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into allegations of misconduct.282  Moreover, attorneys are able to analyze 
“grey areas of fact and law to determine whether or not the alleged conduct 
is in fact illegal and whether the evidence supports the allegations.”283  In 
short, attorneys are better qualified to recognize wrongdoing, both because 
of their professional responsibilities and because of their expertise.284 
Furthermore, when placed in a position where they have to make the 
decision of whether or not to report organizational misconduct, in-house 
attorneys are in a unique position of being both a lawyer for, and an 
employee of, the organization.285  The relationship between an in-house 
attorney and his or her client “cannot be characterized solely as an attorney-
client relationship, but must be viewed as an employer-employee 
relationship as well.”286  Unlike outside counsel, in-house attorneys cannot 
make the relatively simpler decision to withdraw representation.287  Since 
the corporation is the in-house attorney’s only client, withdrawal of 
representation can be an inadequate solution.288  Additionally, unlike 
outside counsel, in-house attorneys are increasingly occupying managerial 
and supervisory roles within corporations.289  Because they increasingly 
have “administrative, managerial, and compliance responsibilities that are 
outside the direct scope of their legal roles,”290 in-house attorneys are even 
more likely to discover information about corporate misconduct.  While it 
may be possible for an in-house attorney to bring the misconduct to his or 
her employer’s attention and resolve it internally, it is possible that the 
“employer’s vision of what is right in any given situation conflicts with the 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the lawyer’s personal ethical 
beliefs, and/or the well being of the community.”291  Whistleblower cases 
involving in-house counsel must take into account the conflicting public 
policies of ensuring the employer complies with the law, while protecting 
the attorney-client privilege that the employer is entitled to as the client.292  
Thus, in addition to ethical and legal considerations, in-house counsel must 
consider the possibility of losing his or her job and livelihood.293 
Having touched on some of the special conflicts faced by in-house 
attorneys, the next few sections explore how they are expected to act under 
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different regimes when deciding whether or not to report potential federal 
securities law violations. 
2.  The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
In 1977, the American Bar Association (ABA) began a six-year study of 
the legal profession that resulted in the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.294  The Model Rules were adopted by the ABA in 1983 and were 
amended on fourteen different occasions before 2002.295  In 2003, the ABA 
made amendments to Rules 1.6 and 1.13 in response to “shaken confidence 
in the effectiveness of the governance and disclosure systems applicable to 
public companies in the United States” in the aftermath of Enron, 
WorldCom, and other similar scandals.296  While the Model Rules are not 
directly enforceable through professional discipline,297 they aim to set 
baseline standards of legal ethics and professional responsibility for states 
to adopt through their own bar associations. 
Three ABA Model Rules are particularly relevant to in-house attorney 
whistleblowers:  Rules 4.1, 1.13, and 1.6. 
a.  Truthfulness in Statements to Others:  Rule 4.1 
Under the first part of Rule 4.1, a lawyer should not, in the course of 
representing a client, knowingly make a false statement of material fact or 
law to a third party.298  The second part of the rule provides that a lawyer 
should not knowingly fail to disclose a material fact that is “necessary to 
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client.”299 
While the ABA Model Rules prohibit lawyers from assisting or 
counseling clients with criminal conduct,300 Rule 4.1 sets forth a specific 
application of this principle.  Generally, a lawyer may withdraw 
representation to avoid assisting with criminal conduct.301  However, as 
stated in the comments to Rule 4.1, “Sometimes it may be necessary for the 
lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion, 
document, affirmation or the like. . . .  If the lawyer can avoid assisting a 
client’s crime or fraud only by disclosing this information, then . . . the 
lawyer is required to do so.”302 
 
 294. ELLEN J. BENNETT, ELIZABETH J. COHEN & MARTIN WHITTAKER, ANNOTATED MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, at vii (7th ed. 2011). 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Barry R. Temkin & Ben Moskovits, Lawyers As Whistleblowers Under the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform Act:  Ethical Conflicts Under the Rules of Professional Conduct 
and SEC Rules, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., July/Aug. 2012, at 10, 12. 
 298. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2013). 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. R. 1.2(d). 
 301. Id. R. 4.1 cmt 3. 
 302. Id. 
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To the limited extent that this rule allows lawyers to disclose 
information, it is relevant to attorney whistleblowers who may wish to 
avoid assisting criminal conduct.  Importantly, however, Rule 4.1 permits 
lawyers to disclose such information “unless the disclosure is prohibited by 
Rule 1.6.”303  Therefore, Rule 4.1 is only available to attorney 
whistleblowers if Rule 1.6 allows for it.304 
b.  Confidentiality of Information:  Rule 1.6 
The attorney’s duty to protect his or her client’s confidential information 
is outlined in Rule 1.6,305 which has been adopted in some form by the 
District of Columbia and all states except California.306  This rule generally 
requires that lawyers maintain client confidentiality but permits disclosure 
in six circumstances, two of which were specifically added in 2003 in 
response to the Enron and WorldCom scandals.307  Prior to the addition of 
these two exceptions, the ABA Model Rules prohibited disclosure of 
confidential client information even when the disclosure was made in order 
to prevent criminal fraud.308  Since most states at the time already allowed 
disclosure under those circumstances, and in an effort to align the Model 
Rules with newly enacted SEC rules, the ABA added the two additional 
exceptions to the confidentiality duty.309 
As a result of the amendment, in addition to preexisting exceptions, 
lawyers are allowed to disclose confidential information if they believe 
disclosure is reasonably necessary to prevent crime or fraud “that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is 
using the lawyer’s services,” or “to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial 
injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably 
certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or 
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services.”310 
 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. R. 1.6. 
 306. Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers:  Can an Attorney Blow the Whistle on a Client 
and Get a Monetary Award? CLIENT ALERT (Latham & Watkins LLP, New York, N.Y.), May 
2013, at 6, [hereinafter, Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers], available at 
http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/SEC-whistleblowers. 
 307. Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 297, at 16; see also BENNETT, COHEN 
& WHITTAKER, supra note 294, at viii. 
 308. See Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, supra note 306, at 2. 
 309. Id. 
 310. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(2)–(3) (2013).  The other exceptions 
are: 
to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm . . . to secure legal 
advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules . . . to establish a claim or 
defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, 
to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based 
upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any 
proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client . . . to comply with 
other law or a court order . . . [and] to detect and resolve conflicts of interest 
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However, when considering whether or not to report violations, an in-
house attorney whistleblower must also consider Rule 1.13 (and its state 
rule equivalent in his or her jurisdiction). 
c.  Organization As Client:  Rule 1.13 
Generally speaking, the Model Rules allow a lawyer to withdraw from 
representing a client in various situations, such as in order to avoid assisting 
with “crime or fraud.”311  An in-house lawyer, however, may be subject to 
special considerations that arise from being in an employer-employee 
relationship with his or her client:  the ABA Model Rules refer to this 
situation in Rule 1.13. 
Rule 1.13 provides that an in-house lawyer should report a potential legal 
violation that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization to 
the highest authority in the organization, unless the lawyer reasonably 
believes that it is not in the organization’s best interest to do so.312  
Therefore, the ABA Model Rules require in-house lawyers to report “up-
the-ladder.”  As stated by the comments to Rule 1.13, “Any measures taken 
should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information 
relating to the representation to persons outside the organization.”313 
The lawyer is permitted to disclose confidential information to outside 
sources only if the lawyer reports the violation to the higher authority who 
refuses to act or delays action, and the lawyer believes that the violation is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization.314  
Although in this situation the lawyer may disclose information regardless of 
whether or not Rule 1.6 permits it, disclosure is limited to situations in 
which “the lawyer reasonably believes [it is] necessary to prevent 
substantial injury to the organization.”315  Moreover, this part of the rule is 
merely permissive—it allows lawyers to choose to disclose information 
externally, but does not require them to do so. 
Rule 1.13 also provides that lawyers who believe they have been 
discharged because of the actions described above, or who withdraw under 
these circumstances, should take steps as reasonably necessary to ensure 
that “the organization’s highest authority is informed of the [lawyer’s] 
discharge or withdrawal.”316  This provision does not mention, however, an 
external remedy if the organization retaliates against the lawyer.317 
 
arising from the lawyer’s change of employment or from changes in the 
composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed information would not 
compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client. 
Id. 
 311. Id. R. 1.16 (b)(3). 
 312. Id. R. 1.13. 
 313. Id. R. 1.13 cmt. 4.  
 314. Id. R. 1.13 (c)(2). 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. R. 1.13 (e). 
 317. Id. 
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The ABA Model Rules only provide baseline standards of legal ethics 
and professional responsibility.318  The next section examines how some 
states’ rules of professional conduct, which lawyers can be held liable for 
violating, are applied to in-house attorney whistleblowers. 
3.  State Rules of Professional Conduct and Whistleblower Protection 
As discussed in Part I.C above, state laws protect whistleblowers through 
whistleblower protection statutes, tort-based wrongful discharge causes of 
action, or both.319  Whether or not a whistleblower is protected in a given 
situation varies from state to state.320  Furthermore, there are state 
variations in attorney-client confidentiality rules as well.  For example, 
under New York’s version of Rule 1.6, lawyers are permitted—but not 
required—to disclose confidential client information in order to prevent a 
crime.321  In contrast, the equivalent rule in New Jersey requires lawyers to 
make the disclosure.322  To complicate matters further, state rules of 
professional conduct can clash with other regimes governing professional 
conduct, such as SEC Part 205.323  This section examines how courts have 
treated the interplay between whistleblower protection and state rules of 
professional conduct. 
a.  Attorney-Client Confidentiality 
Balla v. Gambro, Inc.324 was a landmark case addressing the interplay 
between whistleblower protection, under a tort-based wrongful discharge 
cause of action, and attorney-client confidentiality.325  Balla, the in-house 
counsel at Gambro, Inc., was dismissed after he informed his employer that 
he would do “whatever necessary” to stop the sale of defective kidney 
dialyzers.326  The Illinois Supreme Court held that Balla had no cause of 
action under a common law wrongful termination claim.327  The court 
reasoned that allowing in-house attorneys to pursue wrongful termination 
claims would compromise the attorney-client privilege.328  According to the 
court, “In-house counsel do not have a choice of whether to follow their 
ethical obligations as attorneys licensed to practice law, or follow the illegal 
and unethical demands of their clients.  In-house counsel must abide by the 
 
 318. See supra note 297 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra Part I.C. 
 320. See supra Part I.C. 
 321. N.Y. JOINT APPELLATE RULES GOVERNING ATTORNEYS R. 1.6(b)(2) (2014); see also 
Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 297, at 16. 
 322. N.J. CT. R. 1.6(b); see also Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 297, at 16. 
 323. See infra Part II.B. 
 324. 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991). 
 325. Id.; see also Lobel, supra note 284, at 1257–60. 
 326. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 106.  Balla was concerned that the dialyzers could cause death 
or serious bodily harm to patients who used them. Id. at 107. 
 327. Id. at 113. 
 328. Id. at 111. 
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Rules of Professional Conduct.”329  Looking to Rule 1.6 of the Illinois 
Rules of Professional Conduct,330 the court stated that Balla had a duty to 
report the confidential information because the client was about to commit 
an act that would result in death or serious bodily injury.331  At the same 
time, the court held that in-house counsel should not be protected by 
wrongful discharge claims, as this would “have a chilling effect on the 
communications between the employer/client and the in-house counsel.”332  
Thus, according to the court, Balla was required to report the confidential 
information even if he lost his job as a result of the disclosure, but he was 
not entitled to wrongful discharge protection as an in-house attorney.333 
In contrast, in General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court,334 the 
California Supreme Court allowed an in-house attorney to proceed with a 
wrongful termination cause of action, finding that there was no particular 
reason to prevent the claim as long as it could be established without 
breaching the attorney-client privilege.335  Thus, if the lawyer could prove 
his claim without violating attorney-client privilege, he could have a valid 
wrongful discharge cause of action.336 
In Willy v. Coastal Corp.,337 an in-house lawyer brought a wrongful 
discharge action against his former employer.338  Willy claimed that he was 
dismissed for insisting that his employer comply with state and federal 
environmental and securities laws.339  The Southern District of Texas 
dismissed the claim340 because of the state’s code of professional 
responsibility.341  The court held that, under the state rules, if an attorney 
believes his client is pursuing an illegal act, he or she may “voluntarily 
withdraw” from representation.342  Should the attorney choose not to 
withdraw “and not to follow the client’s wishes, he should not be surprised 
that his client no longer desires his services.”343  However, if the client 
chose not to end the relationship, the attorney would then be required to 
withdraw representation.344  The court also saw no reason to distinguish 
between in-house and outside counsel in this regard.345 
 
 329. Id. at 109. 
 330. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 1.6(b). 
 331. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109. 
 332. Id. at 110. 
 333. Id. at 109. 
 334. 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994). 
 335. Id. at 490. 
 336. Id. 
 337. 647 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th 
Cir. 1988). 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. at 119. 
 341. Id. at 118. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 118–19.  While outside counsel may withdraw representation from a client, in-
house counsel are effectively giving up their jobs when they do so. 
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The manner in which courts vary in their application of state rules 
governing attorney-client confidentiality is one factor that in-house attorney 
whistleblowers must take into account when deciding whether to disclose 
information.  Another factor that these whistleblowers must consider is the 
job duty exception. 
b.  The Job Duty Exception 
In Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., the Minnesota Supreme Court confronted 
the job duty exception.346  Brian Kidwell was the in-house counsel for 
Sybaritic, Inc. when he sent an email entitled “A Difficult Duty” to the 
management team.347  In the email, Kidwell expressed concern regarding 
the organization’s “pervasive culture of dishonesty,”348 identified specific 
violations,349 and indicated that if the organization did not react 
appropriately to the allegations, he would alert the “appropriate 
authorities.”350  Additionally, Kidwell discussed the situation with, and sent 
a copy of the email to, his father, although the management team was not 
aware of this at the time.351 
The day after he sent the email, the management team met with Kidwell 
to discuss the issues he had addressed.352  Although the team created a plan 
to resolve these issues, Kidwell was discharged a few weeks later.353  
According to Sybaritic, Kidwell was terminated because of a series of 
difficulties that made the organization unable to trust him, particularly after 
becoming aware that Kidwell had sent the email to his father.354  Kidwell, 
however, filed suit against the organization claiming that they had retaliated 
against him in violation of the state’s whistleblower statute.355 
Kidwell prevailed in the District Court of Minnesota.356  The Minnesota 
Court of Appeals, however, held that “an employee does not engage in 
protected conduct under the whistleblower act if the employee makes a 
report in fulfillment of the duties of his or her job.”357  Since Kidwell’s 
email was sent in the scope of his job and not with the intent to disclose 
misconduct, the court concluded, it was not protected under the state’s 
whistleblower protection statute.358 
 
 346. Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010) (plurality opinion). 
 347. Id. at 221. 
 348. Id. at 222. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. at 223. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 224. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. at 221. 
 356. Id. at 225; see also Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., No. 05-13989, 2007 WL 1303946 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 2, 2007), rev’d, 749 N.W.2d 855, 866 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d, 
784 N.W.2d 220. 
 357. Kidwell, 749 N.W.2d at 866 (citing Grundtner v. Univ. of Minn., 730 N.W.2d 323 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2007)). 
 358. Id. at 869–70. 
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The Minnesota Supreme Court also denied Kidwell’s claim but for 
different reasons.359  The opinion explicitly rejected the appellate judges’ 
view that the state whistleblower statute created a blanket exception for 
disclosures made in the scope of job duties.360  Yet, the Supreme Court 
decided the case on very similar grounds:  the majority opinion stated that 
“an employee who ‘has, as part of his normal duties, been assigned the task 
of investigating and reporting wrongdoing . . . and, in fact, reports that 
wrongdoing through normal channels’ is not engaging in protected conduct 
. . . .”361  In this case, because Kidwell’s intent in sending the email was to 
advise his client, and not to blow the whistle, the state whistleblower statute 
did not protect his disclosure.362  Effectively, there was no protection for 
Kidwell “specifically because his actions directly carried out his job duties, 
despite the plurality’s alleged denial of any such exception.”363 
According to the plurality, however, “only in a very rare case would an 
employee who is responsible for reporting illegal conduct and who reports 
such conduct through normal channels, be able to prove that the report was 
made for the purpose of exposing an illegality.”364 
Ultimately, the outcome of the case hinged on a concurring opinion, 
which was analyzed on completely different grounds.365  Instead of job 
duties, the concurrence focused on traditional notions of client 
confidentiality.366  “[W]hen a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to 
the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client 
relationship.”367  Even though the state whistleblower protection statute 
provided no such exception, the concurring opinion stressed that “the 
statute does not trump [the court’s] power and responsibility to regulate the 
bar, particularly in matters of ethics.”368  Therefore, according to the 
concurring opinion in Kidwell, the confidentiality requirements surrounding 
attorney-client relationships preempt the protection provided to attorney 
whistleblowers by applicable whistleblower protection statutes.369 
In addition to state rules of professional responsibility, in-house attorney 
whistleblowers who wish to disclose federal securities violations must 
consider special rules that apply to attorneys who appear before the SEC. 
 
 359. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 226, 230–31. 
 360. Id. at 226. 
 361. Id. at 228 (quoting Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001)). 
 362. Id. at 228–29; see also Banick, supra note 28, at 1891. 
 363. Banick, supra note 28, at 1894 (citing FREDERICK T. GOLDER & DAVID R. GOLDER, 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW:  COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION § 1:149 (3d ed. 2010)). 
 364. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 238–39 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 365. Banick, supra note 28, at 1892. 
 366. Id.; see also Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 233 (Magnuson, C.J., concurring). 
 367. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 233. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id.; see also Banick, supra note 28, at 1892. 
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4.  The SEC’s Attorney Conduct Rules:  Part 205 
In 2003, pursuant to SOX, the SEC promulgated Rule 205,370 which sets 
standards for attorney professional responsibility.371  These rules, also 
referred to as “Part 205,”372 provide the minimum standards of professional 
conduct that apply to attorneys who practice and appear before the SEC on 
behalf of an issuer.373  “Appearing and practicing” is broadly defined in this 
context; for example, it can include a lawyer who merely advises on U.S. 
securities law with respect to a document he or she knows will be filed with 
the SEC.374  Similarly, “issuer” is broadly defined and even include “any 
person controlled by an issuer.”375 
Under Part 205, an in-house attorney is permitted to disclose certain 
confidential information (in violation of client-attorney privilege) outside of 
the organization.376  However, attorneys are required first to report the 
information to the company’s chief legal officer, who must in turn report up 
the corporate ladder.377  Only if internal reporting fails (and reporting 
would prevent harm to the corporation or to the investors) may the attorney 
disclose confidential client information outside the organization.378  Thus, 
in order to comply with SOX and its whistleblower protection provisions, 
attorneys must first report any suspected wrongdoing internally.379 
Part 205 does not require lawyers to report violations to the SEC or to 
any other external organization.380  It does, however, permit attorneys to 
disclose confidential information—without the consent of the issuer or 
client—when reporting violations to the SEC in three circumstances.381  
The lawyer can report out to the SEC if he or she believes disclosure is 
necessary to:  (1) prevent the issuer from committing a violation that is 
likely to cause substantial injury to either the financial interest or property 
of the issuer or the investors; (2) prevent the issuer from committing perjury 
or perpetrating a fraud in a Commission investigation or administrative 
proceeding; or (3) rectify the consequences of a violation by the issuer that 
has caused or may cause substantial injury to either the financial interest or 
 
 370. 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2014). 
 371. See Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 297, at 14. 
 372. See Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, supra note 306, at 5. 
 373. Id.  Attorneys who appear before the SEC and are found in violation of Part 205 can 
be sanctioned by the SEC. 17 C.F.R. § 205.6. 
 374. Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, supra note 306, at 5. 
 375. Id.  Part 205 refers to section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange 
Act) to define the term “issuer.” See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(h).  Under the Exchange Act, “any 
person who issues or proposes to issue any security” is an issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) 
(2012). 
 376. Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 297, at 14. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, supra note 306, at 5. 
 381. Id. 
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property of the issuer or the investors, for which the lawyer’s services were 
used.382 
Thus, Part 205 allows—in limited circumstances—for attorneys to 
disclose confidential client information to the SEC without the client’s 
consent, and thereby to qualify as protected whistleblowers.383 
5.  How Attorneys Are Expected To Act Under SOX 
As discussed above, Part 205 mandates that under SOX, while attorneys 
are required initially to report federal securities violations internally,384 
they are later permitted to disclose information to the SEC in order to 
prevent “a material violation that is likely to cause substantial injury to the 
financial interest or property of the issuer or investors.”385  Therefore, under 
SOX, attorneys are required to “report up” but have no obligation to “report 
out.”386 
In Van Asdale v. International Game Technology, the plaintiffs were in-
house attorneys that sued their former employer under the SOX 
antiretaliation provisions.387  The organization, a publicly traded slot 
machine distributor, was in the process of merging with another 
company.388  The in-house counsel discovered that one of the acquired 
company’s major assets was tied in a patent infringement claim and that the 
underlying patent was probably invalid.389  They also found that the high-
ranking officers in the acquired company may have known about the 
invalidity of the patent and therefore that the public disclosure about the 
upcoming merger was potentially misleading.390  The attorneys brought 
these issues to the attention of their employer and were fired shortly 
thereafter.391 
Because this kind of misleading public disclosure can fall under 
securities fraud, the attorneys filed a wrongful discharge suit under SOX.392  
Their former employer moved to dismiss the case on grounds that the 
attorneys could not prove their case without breaching attorney-client 
confidentiality.393  The Ninth Circuit noted, however, that because there is 
nothing in SOX to indicate “that in-house attorneys are not also protected 
from retaliation under this section,” a lawyer that reports misconduct and 
experiences retaliation may bring a claim under SOX.394  The court 
 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. 
 384. See Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 297, at 14. 
 385. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2014). 
 386. See Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 297, at 14. 
 387. Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 388. Id. at 991–92. 
 389. Id. at 992–93. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. at 993. 
 392. Id. at 994. 
 393. Id. at 994–95. 
 394. Id. at 996. 
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reasoned that by taking precautions to balance the attorneys’ claim against 
the company’s right to preserve confidentiality, the case could proceed.395 
6.  How Attorneys Are Expected To Act Under the Dodd-Frank Act 
As described above, for in-house attorneys who decide to report 
misconduct, SOX and Part 205 generally require them to report information 
internally as a first step in order to be protected by the whistleblower 
antiretaliation provisions.396  Similarly, courts have extended antiretaliation 
protection to whistleblowers who report misconduct internally under the 
Dodd-Frank Act.397 
The Fifth Circuit’s recent ruling in Asadi, however, requires the 
opposite.398  The court in Asadi held that whistleblowers must report 
misconduct externally and directly to the SEC in order to be protected 
under the Dodd-Frank Act.399  As a result of the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
(and existing opposing case law from district courts in three other 
circuits),400 the interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower 
protection regime, and particularly its antiretaliation provisions, is ripe for a 
circuit split.  This creates uncertainty over the extent of protection the 
Dodd-Frank Act provides to employees who report violations of federal 
securities law internally or to other government entities rather than directly 
to the SEC. 
Moreover, under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, attorneys who choose 
to report misconduct may find it particularly difficult to act in compliance 
with both the Dodd-Frank Act and other governing regimes.  By only 
extending antiretaliation protection to whistleblowers who report first and 
directly to the SEC, the Fifth Circuit ruling has created a conflict between 
how lawyers must act under the Dodd-Frank Act as opposed to SOX and 
Part 205.401  This means that attorney whistleblowers who act in 
compliance with SOX and Part 205, and make an internal report, may find 
themselves without recourse for retaliation under the Dodd-Frank Act.402  
Although lawyers may still bring an antiretaliation claim under SOX, they 
 
 395. Id. at 995–96.  This is in direct contrast with Balla, where the court held that in-
house attorneys could not bring a wrongful discharge claim even if they were required to 
report wrongdoing externally. See supra notes 324–33 and accompanying text. 
 396. See supra notes 337–79 and accompanying text. 
 397. See supra notes 228–47 and accompanying text. 
 398. See supra notes 248–53 and accompanying text. 
 399. See supra notes 248–53 and accompanying text. 
 400. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 401. Under SOX and Part 205, attorneys are first required to report misconduct internally, 
whereas the Fifth Circuit ruling requires attorneys to report to the SEC in order to be 
afforded whistleblower protection under Dodd-Frank. See supra notes 248–53, 384–86 and 
accompanying text. 
 402. The court in Asadi did not provide the plaintiff anti-retaliation protection under 
Dodd-Frank, because he first reported the misconduct internally. See supra notes 248–53 and 
accompanying text. 
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will need to consider shorter statutory periods and restrictions on where the 
claim can be brought.403 
II.  UP OR OUT?  STATE OR FEDERAL LAWS?  THE DILEMMA ATTORNEY 
WHISTLEBLOWERS FACE IN CHOOSING WHERE TO REPORT 
As described in Part I, various different laws govern the protections 
available to whistleblowers in general and attorney whistleblowers in 
particular.  These different laws not only provide different levels of 
protection, but may require different responses by the whistleblower in 
order for him or her to be eligible for protection.  This is especially true for 
attorney whistleblowers.404  With this in mind, the next Part explores how 
the different laws interact with each other, and when a given law applies 
over another. 
A.  Internal Reporting, External Reporting, and a Flexible Middle Ground 
A recurring issue—for whistleblowers in general and attorney 
whistleblowers in particular—is whether to report misconduct internally or 
externally.  Part II.A discusses some of the advantages and disadvantages of 
required internal and external reporting, as well as a flexible approach.  
Because whistleblower protections have developed as somewhat of a 
patchwork, they vary in their scope and application, particularly with 
respect to reporting requirements.405  Most whistleblower protections under 
state statutes and common law tend to protect only external reporting, 
whereas federal whistleblower protections also include internal reporting.406  
Because the starting point for whether or not different regimes protect 
attorney whistleblowers is often where they report wrongdoing, this section 
provides some justifications for each side. 
Studies show that whistleblowers choose where to report—either 
internally or externally—based on a wide variety of factors.407  These 
include the whistleblower’s status in the organization, the status of the 
alleged wrongdoer, organizational culture, and how significant the 
misconduct is.408  For example, whistleblowers may seek to report 
wrongdoing internally if their aim is to stop a colleague’s unlawful activity, 
whereas they may report externally if they are motivated by a desire to stop 
large-scale organizational misconduct or to protect public welfare.409 
Some regimes require whistleblowers in general—and attorney 
whistleblowers in particular—to report violations internally in order to be 
 
 403. See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text. 
 404. See supra Part I.D. 
 405. Lobel, supra note 284, at 1249. 
 406. Id. at 1249–50. 
 407. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle to the 
Media, and Why:  Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 151, 162–63 (1994). 
 408. Id. 
 409. Campbell, supra note 26, at 570. 
3382 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
 
protected.410  Proponents of internal reporting point out that it provides 
employers with an opportunity to rectify the violation before authorities are 
involved.411  Internal reporting can help maintain the “corporate chain of 
command,” avoid negative publicity, and promote employee loyalty.412  
Moreover, it may be more efficient for employers, rather than governmental 
bodies, to try and rectify the problem.413  With respect to the 
whistleblower’s own preferences, employees tend to prefer to report 
violations internally first.414 
Opponents argue that internal reporting requirements lead to cover-ups 
and retaliation by employers.415  Additionally, in some situations, 
employees may prefer to report externally; for example, when the 
whistleblower’s supervisor is involved in the misconduct, when the 
employer has ignored other complaints, or when the organizational culture 
does not allow dissent.416 
Some regimes, on the other hand, require external reporting in order for a 
whistleblower to be protected.417  Supporters of external reporting point out 
that violations should be publicized and investigated to ensure compliance 
with the law.418  Some argue that involving authorities reduces the cost of 
investigation.419  Finally, in cases where the violation is criminal, 
proponents argue that external reporting allows for the quick involvement 
of the criminal justice system, which is necessary for deterrence and 
retribution purposes.420 
 
 410. Examples of such regimes include the rules applicable to attorneys under SOX and 
Part 205.  See supra Part I.D.4. 
 411. Sinzdak, supra note 118, at 1654; see also Campbell, supra note 26, at 570 (“For 
this reason, consumer protection activist Ralph Nader believes that ‘[f]ormal channels for 
bringing a situation to the attention of top management should be pursued first,’ to offer 
companies an opportunity to investigate illegalities and remedy situations before financial 
and reputational damage occurs from outside exposure.” (alteration in original)). 
 412. Sinzdak, supra note 118, at 1654; see also David Culp, Whistleblowers:  Corporate 
Anarchists or Heroes?  Towards a Judicial Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 109, 133–34 
(1995); Laura Simoff, Confusion and Deterrence:  The Problems that Arise from a 
Deficiency in Uniform Laws and Procedures for Environmental “Whistleblowers,” 8 DICK. 
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 325, 338–39 (1999). 
 413. Sinzdak, supra note 118, at 1655. 
 414. Id. at 1652 n.162 (“[W]histleblowers typically disclose their concerns externally 
only after they have received no corrective response internally, and only after much 
agonizing” (quoting John A. Gray, The Scope of Whistleblower Protection in the State of 
Maryland:  A Comprehensive Statute Is Needed, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 225, 226–27 (2004)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 415. Id. at 1655. 
 416. Id.  Additionally, as discussed above, whistleblowers may prefer to report externally 
because they are motivated by a desire to stop large-scale organizational misconduct rather 
than to stop one colleague’s behavior. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 417. An example of this is the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act 
antiretaliation provisions in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 
2013). See supra Part I.B.3. 
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Those who challenge external reporting requirements say that it ignores a 
practical reality:  whistleblowers generally tend to report internally first.421  
Additionally, opponents argue that not all violations deserve the public’s 
attention, time, and money, and internal reporting is therefore more 
efficient.422  For example, “incompetent or inadequately performing 
employees” may forgo the opportunity to make an internal report in order to 
make a premature external report so that they can “attain celebrity” or 
receive an award.423  Moreover, critics argue that because organizations 
will not be given the opportunity to investigate the allegations, false or 
inaccurate reports may increase.424  External reporting requirements can 
also cause organizations to mistrust their employees, undermining the 
“mutually beneficial reliance” in an employer-employee relationship.425  
Finally, opponents argue that external reporting requirements can shift 
some of the regulatory burden from desirable regulators—such as elected 
and appointed government officials—to employees, who may be ill 
prepared or have questionable motives.426 
Internal reporting has traditionally been considered more culturally 
acceptable than external reporting.427  However, there has been a gradual 
shift in the public’s opinion of whistleblowers that report wrongdoing 
externally.428  Historically, whistleblowers who reported misconduct 
externally were perceived to threaten an organization’s “structure, 
cohesiveness, and public image,” which in turn threatened societal 
prosperity.429  Whistleblowers’ motivations were questioned, and they were 
thought to violate the cultural notion of employer-employee loyalty.430  
Furthermore, it was thought that external whistleblowing was not necessary 
to deter misconduct.431 
However, a “cultural shift from reverence to distrust of large companies” 
starting in the second half of the twentieth century led to a corresponding 
change in the public perception of whistleblowers who expose corporate 
 
 421. Id. at 1652 (citing Gray, supra note 414, at 226–27; Terry Morehead Dworkin & 
Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing:  Protecting the Interests of the Employee, 
the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267, 281 n.71 (1991)). 
 422. Id. at 1654. 
 423. Campbell, supra note 26, at 595–96. 
 424. Id. at 596 (citing WHISTLEBLOWING:  IN DEFENSE OF PROPER ACTION 53 (Marek 
Arszulowicz & Wojciech W. Gasparski eds., 2011); Ebersole, supra note 35, at 127; The 
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions:  Considerations for Effectively Preparing for and 
Responding to Whistleblowers, CLIENTS & FRIENDS MEMO (Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft 
LLP, New York, N.Y.), May 26, 2011, at 2, available at http://www.cadwalader.com/
uploads/cfmemos/80b476693cd5c2e25ea0246747b6ef36.pdf). 
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. at 596–97. 
 427. Id. at 570. 
 428. Id. 
 429. Id. at 570–71 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 430. Id. at 571–72. 
 431. Id. at 573 (“Even recently, the indispensability of external whistleblowing has been 
doubted by then-Representative Johnny Isakson when he stated, ‘I would submit to my 
colleague it would not have taken a whistle-blower at Enron to blow it sky high.’”). 
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wrongdoing, particularly externally.432  Over time, notions of employer-
employee loyalty started to change, encouraging loyalty toward other 
individuals who work for the organization rather than to the organization 
itself.433  Moreover, mistrust of whistleblowers and their motives decreased 
as mistrust of large corporations and their motives increased.434  External 
reporting, which was once doubted and thought unnecessary, started to be 
viewed as not only necessary, but also essential.435  The law developed to 
accommodate this cultural shift:  whistleblower statutes have also evolved 
to accept or even promote external reporting.436 
While these cultural changes have led to an acceptance of external 
reporting alongside internal reporting, a third approach proposes a flexible 
standard towards reporting requirements.437  This approach suggests that 
whistleblower laws should allow flexibility on where whistleblowers should 
report violations and protect them regardless of whether they report 
internally or externally.438  Under this approach, whistleblowers who may 
be misinformed or uneducated about where they should report, but who 
have acted in good faith, are not penalized for their attempts to uncover 
misconduct.439 
A flexible approach to reporting requirements may protect a wider range 
of whistleblowers and their different situations.440  Such an approach could 
potentially encourage whistleblowers to come forward, by counterbalancing 
the confusion produced by different requirements under different laws.441  
Since some whistleblowers can be deterred by the uncertainty of whether or 
not they will be protected, this approach could help diminish such an effect 
by offering greater protection.442 
However, a flexible approach to reporting can have two major 
drawbacks.443  First, since it provides whistleblowers with the freedom of 
deciding where to report, whistleblowers may decide to report to a 
suboptimal party.444  There may be certain inherent advantages to reporting 
to a particular entity, and since a flexible approach does not incentivize 
whistleblowers to report to any particular party, they may choose a less 
desirable route.445 
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 434. Id. at 575–76. 
 435. Id. at 576. 
 436. Id. at 579–30. 
 437. Sinzdak, supra note 118, at 1660–61. 
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A second drawback to a flexible approach is that it may undesirably 
increase the number of whistleblower lawsuits or prolong existing suits.446  
With a flexible approach to reporting requirements, cases are less likely to 
be dismissed at an early stage for failing to meet the standards required for 
protection.447 
These justifications—for internal reporting, external reporting, and a 
flexible approach—are important for an attorney whistleblower because 
they can determine whether he or she is protected against retaliation. 
B. State Laws Versus Federal Laws 
As explored in Part I.D, in-house attorney whistleblowers that report 
federal securities violations are subject to various regimes and can be 
expected to act differently under each one.  This section discusses the 
choice of law issues that can determine which regime is applicable. 
1.  Choice of Law:  State Versus State 
Putting aside the issue of whether or not federal law preempts state law 
via Part 205,448 attorneys may still have to consider choice-of-law issues 
with respect to different states.  Whether or not a particular situation 
permits or even requires an attorney to report a violation externally depends 
on what jurisdiction he or she is operating in.449  Moreover, some lawyers 
may be licensed to practice in different jurisdictions, and a lawyer’s conduct 
may even “involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction.”450 
ABA Model Rule 8.5 addresses these issues.451  The first part of this rule 
provides that lawyers are subject to the disciplinary authority of both the 
jurisdiction in which they are licensed, and the jurisdiction in which they 
provide or offer services (whether or not they are licensed in that 
jurisdiction).452  The second part addresses choice of law issues.453  
According to this second part, the professional rules of the jurisdiction in 
which a tribunal sits will govern matters pending before the tribunal, unless 
the tribunal provides otherwise.454  For other matters, the lawyer is subject 
to the professional rules of the jurisdiction in which the underlying conduct 
occurred, or where the predominant effect of the conduct was.455  
Interestingly, if a lawyer “reasonably believes” the predominant effect of 
 
 446. Id. 
 447. Id. 
 448. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 449. For example, lawyers in New York are permitted to break attorney-client 
confidentiality to prevent a crime, whereas lawyers in New Jersey are required to do so. See 
supra notes 321–22 and accompanying text; see also Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, 
supra note 306, at 17. 
 450. Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, supra note 306, at 17. 
 451. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2013). 
 452. Id. R. 8.5(a). 
 453. Id. R. 8.5(b). 
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 455. Id. 
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his or her conduct occurs in a particular jurisdiction, and the conduct in 
question conforms to the rules of that jurisdiction, the lawyer will not be 
subject to discipline.456 
Although ABA Model Rule 8.5 aims to provide some guidance in this 
area, in practice the Rule is complex and can be uncertain in application.457  
Furthermore, not all states have adopted it:  as of May 2013, twenty-seven 
states had adopted the most recent version, nine states had adopted a 
modified version, two states still used an earlier version, one state used a 
modified version of an earlier rule, and twelve states had adopted no 
version of the rule at all.458  Therefore, despite the existence of ABA Model 
Rule 8.5, there can still be a significant lack of clarity as to which state’s 
professional rules apply to an attorney whistleblower. 
2.  Choice of Law:  Federal Versus State 
In order to provide attorneys with the whistleblower protections of the 
Dodd-Frank Act and SOX, the SEC must examine his or her conduct under 
their professional rules as provided by Part 205.459  However, the 
appropriate response by an attorney to a potential violation may differ under 
Part 205 and a given state’s own professional rules:  for example, while Part 
205 may permit the disclosure of confidential information to the SEC 
without the client’s consent, it is possible that the state in the attorney’s 
jurisdiction may prohibit such disclosure.460  Thus, an attorney must 
consider whether federal or state law applies in order to determine not only 
the whistleblower protections available but also whether or not he or she 
will be at risk of professional disciplinary action for disclosing confidential 
information.461 
Part 205 only applies to attorneys who appear or practice before the SEC 
on behalf of an issuer.462  Therefore, this conflict (between federal and state 
professional rules) in the context of attorney whistleblowers of federal 
securities violations only applies to attorneys who appear or practice before 
the SEC in representation of an issuer.463 
Since Part 205 sets forth “minimum standards of professional conduct,” it 
acts as a “one-way ratchet in favor of disclosure without client consent.”464  
 
 456. Id. 
 457. Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, supra note 306, at 17. 
 458. Id. 
 459. See supra notes 370–83 and accompanying text. 
 460. The Southern District of Texas dismissed the in-house lawyer’s antiretaliation claim 
in Willy v. Coastal Corp. because the state’s code of professional responsibility prohibited 
such disclosures. See supra notes 337–45 and accompanying text. 
 461. Since attorneys are licensed and regulated by states, they must account for the state 
ethics rules even if they are considering federal claims. See infra note 295 and 
accompanying text. 
 462. See supra notes 372–75 and accompanying text. 
 463. See supra notes 372–75 and accompanying text.  Since Part 205 only applies to this 
category of attorneys, other attorneys will only need to consider state professional rules. 
 464. Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, supra note 306, at 6. 
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Thus, if the state professional rules in a jurisdiction forbid disclosure of 
confidential client information to external organizations, but Part 205 
permits disclosure—for example, where the attorney reasonably believes 
that the client is a continuing bad actor—the SEC claims that Part 205 
governs, and disclosure is permitted.465  In situations where a jurisdiction 
requires the lawyer to disclose the confidential information pertaining to a 
violation,466 however, state rules will govern and Part 205 will take a back 
seat.467  Therefore, the attorney will be required to disclose the confidential 
information.468  Of course, in a situation where neither Part 205 nor the 
state permits disclosure of confidential client information, the lawyer will 
be prohibited from doing so and cannot seek whistleblower protection.469 
The SEC claims that, if necessary, Part 205 will trump state professional 
rules as the minimum standard for professional conduct.  However this 
issue is far from settled, and several state associations have publicly voiced 
their disagreement. 
The first state challenge to the SEC’s rules for attorney conduct came 
from the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) less than six months 
after Part 205 was adopted.470  The WSBA issued a proposed interim 
opinion disagreeing with the SEC’s claim that Part 205 preempted state 
ethics rules.471  The SEC’s general counsel responded with a comment 
letter that, among other things, pointed out that the WSBA’s position was 
“inconsistent with prevailing Supreme Court precedent.  The Court has 
consistently upheld the authority of federal agencies to implement rules of 
conduct that diverge from and supersede state laws that address the same 
conduct.”472  Nevertheless, the WSBA adopted the interim opinion.473 
The State Bar of California, which has the strictest attorney 
confidentiality rules of all the states,474 also wrote a letter to the SEC during 
the same time period.475  The letter stated that it was unclear whether the 
SEC had the authority to promulgate rules that preempted states rules, and 
that the State Bar of California did not have the power to refuse to enforce 
state statutes “on the basis of federal preemption unless an appellate court 
has so ruled.”476  In 2004, the association followed up with a letter stating 
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that “California attorneys disclosing client confidences to the SEC could 
potentially be subject to State Bar discipline and/or breach of fiduciary duty 
claims. . . .  California attorneys cannot presume there is a safe harbor if 
they disclose client confidences to the SEC.”477 
The SEC’s general counsel reiterated the SEC’s position in an April 2004 
speech, stating that “where a federal rule says you may do something and a 
state rule says you may not, there is a conflict and the federal rule should 
prevail.”478  The general counsel went further and hinted that the SEC 
would support lawyers who were caught in the tension between state rules 
and Part 205.479  Eight months later, the California State Bar published a 
sixty-three-page article extensively analyzing the conflict from the states’ 
point of view and reiterating that Part 205 does not trump California state 
law.480 
The Part 205 preemption issue was not widely discussed between 2004 
and 2013, even though the SEC’s 2011 rules implementing the 
whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act incorporated Part 205 in 
considering attorney whistleblowers.481 
Then, in October 2013, New York became the third state to oppose the 
SEC’s federal preemption position.482  The Committee on Professional 
Ethics of the New York County Lawyers’ Association (NYCLA) issued a 
formal opinion addressing the preemption issue.483  The opinion stated that 
New York rules allow attorneys to disclose “confidential information in 
different, more limited circumstances than the SEC rules.”484 
The preemption issue is controversial because although it can be 
acceptable for the SEC to sanction an attorney for unprofessional conduct in 
an SEC proceeding,485 “it is quite another for the federal government to 
seek to regulate attorney-client confidential communications.  The 
Constitution does not give the federal government the right to license or 
regulate the practice of law.”486  After all, even federal prosecutors are 
subject to state rules governing professional conduct.487  Therefore, state 
professional conduct rules also govern lawyers who work for the SEC.488  
In light of this, it can be controversial for SEC lawyers to be bound by state 
ethics rules but to allow federal securities laws to “trump” state ethics rules 
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governing client confidentiality in other cases.489  It is therefore not 
surprising that thus far, no court has directly found that SEC regulations 
preempt state ethics rules that govern attorney-client confidentiality.490  
However, states vary on how deferentially they have treated SEC rules.491  
And since it is the states, and not the federal government, that provide 
plenary law licenses, attorneys must account for state ethics rules even if 
they are considering federal claims.492 
C.  A Hypothetical Scenario:  Which Law Should an Attorney 
Whistleblower Break First? 
Having discussed the various applicable issues affecting in-house 
attorney whistleblowers throughout this Note, this section revisits the 
hypothetical scenario posed in the Introduction. 
Imagine that as the in-house counsel to a publicly traded corporation, you 
have discovered that your employer is violating federal securities law and 
must decide what to do next.  Assume that you are licensed to practice and 
have substantial contacts in both the states of Texas and New Jersey.  You 
practice before the SEC and believe your employer’s federal securities 
violations are criminal in nature.  How should you act in order to prevent 
yourself from retaliation and avoid sanctions? 
First, you might consider the antiretaliation protection afforded under the 
Dodd-Frank Act.493  You are in Texas, and after looking at the recent Fifth 
Circuit ruling in Asadi,494 you understand that you must report directly to 
the SEC in order to be protected from retaliation under the Dodd-Frank 
Act.495  However, the moment you do so, you have just violated SOX and 
Part 205:  these regimes require you to first report your findings 
internally.496  In fact, you may now be facing SEC sanctions, since you 
failed to make the appropriate internal disclosures.497  On top of this, you 
may have just violated the Texas rules for professional conduct:  under the 
district court’s ruling in Willy v. Coastal Corp., you should have either 
reported the violation internally or resigned.498  Therefore, you do not have 
a cause of action for wrongful termination under state law,499 and in fact, 
you may face state bar association sanctions or even disbarment.500 
Perhaps, to avoid this situation, you choose to report the violation 
internally.  By doing this, you are in compliance with SOX and Part 205, 
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 493. See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text. 
 494. See supra notes 248–53 and accompanying text. 
 495. See supra notes 248–53 and accompanying text. 
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 499. See supra notes 337–45 and accompanying text. 
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which require you to make an internal disclosure.501  However, if you are 
fired, the antiretaliation provisions under Dodd-Frank Act may not protect 
you.502  Additionally, although you have acted in compliance with the 
Texas state rules of professional conduct, you do not have a wrongful 
termination cause of action.503  Nevertheless, you are still protected by the 
antiretaliation provisions in SOX and should file a claim with OSHA within 
the next ninety days to benefit from protection.504 
However, since you are also licensed in and have substantial contacts 
with New Jersey, you may be subject to other laws and rules.505  Since 
ABA Model Rule 8.5 can be uncertain in application, you are not sure what 
state’s rules for professional conduct you will be held accountable to.506  
Because you have now made an internal report and failed to alert the 
authorities about a criminal federal securities law violation, you may have 
violated the New Jersey rules for professional conduct.507  If so, you may 
face sanctions and potentially be disbarred.508  On the other hand, you have 
acted in accordance with the rules under Part 205, which require you to 
make an initial internal report.509  Even further, you cannot be sure whether 
Part 205 will trump New Jersey’s rules of professional conduct.510 
This hypothetical shows the dilemma an in-house whistleblower can face 
at a very basic level.  Aside from the issues discussed here, a whistleblower 
must also consider the nonlegal repercussions at social, professional, and 
personal levels.  Even without considering those factors, and as this 
hypothetical example demonstrates, in-house whistleblowers can find 
themselves in a situation where their decision boils down to deciding which 
law or rule to violate first. 
III.  A STANDARDIZED EXPECTATION FOR IN-HOUSE ATTORNEY 
WHISTLEBLOWERS:  REPORT UP, THEN OUT 
As discussed in Parts I and II, whistleblowers in general—and attorney 
whistleblowers in particular—need to consider a number of different factors 
under various and sometimes conflicting laws to understand whether or not 
they will be protected against retaliation.  The hypothetical scenario 
outlined in Part II.C demonstrated how in-house attorney whistleblowers 
may be in violation of at least one governing rule or law, no matter how 
they act or where they report.  This Part proposes that in-house attorneys 
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 502. See supra notes 398–403 and accompanying text. 
 503. In Willy v. Coastal Corp., the Southern District of Texas denied antiretaliation 
protection to an in-house lawyer who was fired after insisting that his employer comply with 
state and federal laws. See supra notes 337–45 and accompanying text. 
 504. See supra notes 197, 403 and accompanying text. 
 505. See supra notes 449–56 and accompanying text. 
 506. See supra notes 457–69 and accompanying text. 
 507. See supra note 322 and accompanying text. 
 508. See supra notes 461, 492 and accompanying text. 
 509. See supra notes 384–86 and accompanying text. 
 510. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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should be uniformly held to a two-tiered reporting standard, similar to the 
standards proposed by SOX and Part 205.511  In-house attorneys should 
be—with some qualified exceptions—required to report internally first and 
permitted to report externally if the underlying violation is not resolved.512  
By imposing a uniform standard, attorney whistleblowers can expose 
misconduct, potentially protecting both organizational and societal welfare, 
without being at risk of violating rules or laws no matter what they do.513 
Whistleblowers can be valuable to both the organization and the public at 
large because they help discover and expose misconduct.514  
Whistleblowers should be protected because they face inherent risks for 
their actions,515 and they increase efficiency by lightening the burden on 
government regulators.516  Moreover, whistleblowers should be protected 
for reasons related to fairness and justice.517  By virtue of their professions, 
in-house attorneys are particularly likely to recognize potential 
misconduct.518  In-house attorneys have the necessary legal expertise to 
spot violations and are often privy to this information, because they are in 
managerial roles within corporations.519  Organizations can be incentivized 
to deter misconduct by taking into account the possibility that their 
employees will become whistleblowers.520  Since in-house attorneys may 
have better access to information and may better understand it,521 
enhancing protections for attorney whistleblowers can provide a further 
incentive for an organization to stop misconduct. 
Whistleblowers’ motivations may affect where they will report 
wrongdoing,522 and allowing attorneys to report misconduct both internally 
and externally can therefore maximize the benefits of whistleblower 
protection discussed above.  Although whistleblowers may generally wish 
to report internally,523 they may sometimes prefer to report externally, 
particularly if the underlying violation is large in scale or if it affects the 
whole organization.524  Thus, requiring attorney whistleblowers to report 
internally but permitting them to report externally if there is no resolution 
protects them regardless of the type of violation.  This can prevent a 
situation where an attorney may opt to stay silent—and refrain from 
exposing large-scale fraud or unlawful behavior—because he or she 
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believes that nothing will be done internally and he or she will not be 
protected if the report is made externally. 
Requiring in-house counsel to report violations internally allows 
misconduct to be investigated and perhaps rectified by the employer,525 
while still allowing attorneys to abide by the attorney-client confidentiality 
rules imposed by their state bar associations.526  Moreover, whistleblowers 
tend to prefer to report internally,527 and whistleblowers who have a duty to 
report may face less social stigma than those who report voluntarily.528  
Incentivizing whistleblowers to utilize internal reporting procedures 
protects the “corporate chain of command,” can avoid potentially 
unnecessary and unavoidable negative publicity, and can help promote 
employees’ loyalty to the organization.529  Additionally, because internal 
reporting can lead to the problem being resolved without government 
involvement, it can be more efficient for all parties involved.530  This is 
particularly relevant in cases involving attorney whistleblowers since they 
are likely to have a better understanding of the legal repercussions of the 
violation and be in the managerial position to stop it.531 
Although allowing a more flexible two-tiered approach may protect a 
wider range of whistleblowers,532 attorney whistleblowers are, as a group, 
less likely to be misinformed or uneducated about the laws that apply to 
them.533  Thus, rather than protecting whistleblowers who are confused 
about where to report, this two-tiered approach—as applied to attorney 
whistleblowers—can protect those who have good reason to make an 
external report.  As long as in-house attorneys are held to a uniform 
standard across state laws, federal laws, and rules of professional conduct—
a requirement to report internally first and subsequent permission to report 
externally under certain conditions—attorneys can reasonably be expected 
to comply.  Such an approach does not provide total freedom for where 
attorneys should first report violations, which could lead them to report to a 
suboptimal entity.534  As applied to attorney whistleblowers in this manner, 
a two-tiered reporting approach is also unlikely to lead to an undesirable 
increase in whistleblower lawsuits,535 since they will be required to follow 
the procedure of first reporting internally and then considering reporting 
externally.  It is thus reasonable, if not desirable, to allow attorneys the 
flexibility to use external reporting channels if they are unsuccessful with 
their initial internal reporting attempts. 
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Permitting external reporting under certain conditions, and as a last 
resort,536 ensures that violations that are not rectified are eventually 
publicized and brought to the attention of the proper authorities.537  While 
supporters of external reporting say that illegal activity should be publicized 
in order to ensure compliance,538 a two-tiered approach may provide the 
benefit of governmental involvement for larger, more important violations 
that the organization was not able to stop after the initial internal report.  In 
such a situation, permitting attorneys to report misconduct externally will 
allow involvement of the criminal justice system, which may be necessary 
in some cases and can fulfill deterrence and retributive purposes.539  
Although some state bar associations already include similar exceptions that 
allow external reporting in their attorney-client confidentiality rules,540 a 
uniform approach would allow attorneys more freedom to bring potentially 
massive federal securities fraud to light, while avoiding the erosion of the 
attorney-client privilege.  Cultural and statutory attitudes to whistleblower 
reporting have changed over time, from accepting only internal reporting to 
also accepting and even encouraging external reporting.541  Laws and rules 
governing attorney whistleblowers should follow this trend while taking 
into account attorney-client confidentiality by requiring an initial internal 
report and permitting later external recourse if necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
The massive financial fraud and whistleblower scandals in recent history 
have led to widespread and devastating financial crises.  The dramatic and 
sometimes unsuccessful experiences of whistleblowers in some of the 
notable cases demonstrate that whistleblowers should be encouraged to 
report misconduct and protected from retaliation when they do so.  In-house 
attorneys, in particular, may be in the best position to uncover fraud.  
However, the current whistleblower protection legal landscape has evolved 
as a patchwork of laws.  In-house attorneys have to navigate a complex web 
of governing regimes and may find themselves in violation of at least one 
law no matter what they do.  A uniform approach to reporting standards can 
resolve this conflict.  In-house attorney whistleblowers should be required 
to report federal securities violations internally first, and permitted to report 
them externally if they are not resolved.  Requiring in-house attorneys to 
report misconduct internally allows organizations the chance to rectify 
potentially devastating federal securities violations, while allowing the 
attorney-client privilege to be maintained.  Finally, permitting external 
reporting as a last resort allows in-house counsel to involve the proper 
 
 536. See supra notes 376–82 and accompanying text. 
 537. See supra notes 376–82 and accompanying text. 
 538. See supra note 418 and accompanying text. 
 539. See supra note 420 and accompanying text. 
 540. See supra note 321 and accompanying text. 
 541. See supra notes 427–36 and accompanying text. 
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authorities when the employer is unwilling or unable to rectify the 
violation. 
